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DO WE NEED HELP USING YELP? REGULATING
ADVERTISING ON MEDIATED REPUTATION SYSTEMS
David Adam Friedman*
Yelp, Angie’s List, Avvo, and similar entities enable consumers to access an
incredibly useful trove of information about peer experiences with businesses and
their goods and services. These “mediated reputation systems,” gatherers and dis-
seminators of consumer peer opinions, are more trusted by consumers than
traditional commercial channels. They are omnipresent, carried everywhere on mo-
bile devices, and used by consumers ready to transact.
Though this information is valuable, a troubling conflict emerges in its presen-
tation. Most of these reputation platforms rely heavily on advertising sales to
support their business models. This reliance compels these entities to display persua-
sive advertising right along with their presentation of authentic peer information.
Consumers expecting to access this authentic peer information must also confront a
persuasive message. The revenue lifeblood for these platforms comes from the very
businesses under peer review.
This Article argues that the power of peer information provides an exceptionally
credible context for persuasive advertising. Accordingly, advertising on reputation
platforms should trigger more rigorous regulation in the form of disclosure require-
ments and prioritized enforcement.
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INTRODUCTION
Yelp, Angie’s List, TripAdvisor, Avvo, and similar entities deploy
technology that has significantly changed the way consumers shop
for almost everything: from dog groomers to furnace technicians,
from greasy-spoon restaurants to travel resorts, and even for crimi-
nal defense lawyers. These companies solicit data from users about
consumer experiences and repackage this data to present right
back to the public. Search-engine, social-media, and retail giants
also gather and disseminate this data, soliciting user reviews and
repackaging them for the use of others. Courtesy of these “medi-
ated reputation systems” (MRS), consumers can access vast
amounts of peer experiences with goods, services, and their sellers
on laptops, the touch of a mobile app, or even a brief voice com-
mand to Siri.1
1. Professor Eric Goldman coined the term “mediated reputation system,” describing
“third-party publisher[s that] gather, organize, and publish reputational information.” Eric
Goldman, The Regulation of Reputational Information, in THE NEXT DIGITAL DECADE: ESSAYS ON
THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET 293, 294 (Berin Szorka & Adam Marcus, eds., 2010), https://
www.nyu.edu/projects/nissenbaum/papers/The-Next-Digital-Decade-Essays-on-the-Future-
of-the-Internet.pdf. He provides as examples “the Better Business Bureau’s ratings, credit
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This newly-created flood of data has proven influential and im-
portant to consumers, but consumers should also beware. Because
of potential conflicts between serving the user public while also
serving paying advertisers, regulators should more closely monitor
MRS business practices.
There is a real tension between the MRS’s need to attract users,
while simultaneously soliciting payments from reviewed entities.
The 2016 class action settlement in Moore v. Angie’s List exposed this
tension.2 The plaintiffs in Moore alleged that Angie’s List failed to
disclose to paid user subscribers that the company received advertis-
ing payments from service providers and that these payments
affected provider review ratings, review content, review availability,
and site placement.3 This case exposed the challenge that many
MRS platforms face: providing an “authentic” user experience
while monetizing the opportunity to do so.4
The problem lies in the way many MRS platforms employ or sup-
port a business model directly dependent on advertising,
promotions, and sales-commission revenue from the very entities
under review on the platform.5 These advertising, promotional, and
commission participation motives can put the “authenticity” of the
user experience at risk. Consumers engage MRS platforms seeking
non-biased experiential information from peer users but instead
encounter this information in a commercial context. Consumers
expecting to access peer information instead encounter persuasive
reports/scores, investment ratings (such as Morningstar mutual fund ratings and Moody
bond ratings), and consumer review sites.” Id. In this article, I exclusively focus on consumer
review sites when using the term “mediated reputation system.”
2. Class Action Settlement Agreement, Moore v. Angie’s List, Inc., No. 15-1243-SD
(E.D. Pa. June 24, 2016), https://www.moorevalsettlement.com/Content/Documents/Set-
tlement%20Agreement.pdf. Angie’s List admitted no wrongdoing in the Settlement
Agreement, so all allegations must be considered with that qualification. Id. at 4–5.
3. Conditional Amended Class Action Complaint, Moore v. Angie’s List, No. 2:15-cv-
01243 (E.D. Pa. July 11, 2016), 2015 WL 1320833 at ¶¶ 1–14.
4. I use “authenticity” to describe a user experience that engages with peer-information
presented free of advertiser influence. A display of information without any advertiser in-
volvement would be less likely to skew toward any particular advertiser—and would offer a
more unbiased information presentation. In the MRS context I use “authenticity” and have
recently used the more ambiguous term “neutrality” as a way “to describe how MRS platforms
convey, both expressly and implicitly, a clear picture and distillation of user opinion about a
business or offering. When the MRS deviates from that ‘clear picture and distillation’
through insertion or influence of [advertiser-generated content], this conception of [authen-
ticity] and neutrality fades.” David Adam Friedman, Addressing the Commercialization of Business
Reputation, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 73, 76 (2017) [hereinafter, Friedman, Addressing Com-
mercialization] (internal citation omitted.).
5. As I explore, infra Part I.B.2, some MRS platforms merely play a smaller role in
supporting a broader engagement campaign for a search engine or social media network.
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messages or redirection that, by design, attempt to trump the pure
presentation of peer reviews.
Peer endorsements have a demonstrably special power of attrac-
tion when collected and presented in aggregate form. As Yelp’s
research shows, presentation of aggregated peer reviews draws in
users at the moment when they wish to transact.6 Of course, the
reason to advertise on an MRS platform would be to nudge the user
away from the user-generated content originally sought toward the
persuasive messaging.
Advertiser-generated content (“AGC”) integrated with user-gen-
erated content (“UGC”) typically constitutes “native advertising.”
Native advertising, an old tactic finding numerous new adopters,
describes commercial content “that bears a similarity to the news,
feature articles, product reviews, entertainment, and other material
that surrounds it online.”7 In 2015, the Federal Trade Commission
promulgated the Enforcement Policy Statement on Deceptively
Formatted Advertisements to lay out ground rules for how content
providers, including providers of product reviews, should distin-
guish commercial content from editorial content for consumers.8
Despite this ubiquitous dynamic, the FTC only makes brief men-
tion of MRS platforms in the Enforcement Policy Statement
(“product reviews”) and offers no illustrative examples involving
MRS platforms. At minimum, this omission is worthy of correction.
The baseline level of disclosure requirements is inadequate to in-
form platform users, in light of the special context of highly
influential peer information, as opposed to the other contexts cov-
ered in the Enforcement Policy Statement. This Article therefore
argues that enhanced disclosure of some form, tighter scrutiny of
MRS platforms, or some combination, would ensure that user ex-
pectations of access to authentic information are met, while still
preserving this flow of valuable consumer information.
This Article describes and explores the immense value that MRS
data brings to the marketplace, while simultaneously addressing the
need to take precautions. This Article  contends that thorough dis-
closure is required to ensure that MRS platforms present
information in a manner that matches consumer expectations for
the nature of that information. Given that advertising on MRS plat-
forms sits at the epicenter of concerns about both peer
6. See infra Part I.A.1.
7. Native Advertising: A Guide for Business, FTC (Dec. 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/tips-
advice/business-center/guidance/native-advertising-guide-businesses.
8. FTC Enforcement Policy Statement on Deceptively Formatted Advertisements, 81
Fed. Reg. 22596 (Apr. 18, 2016).
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endorsements and native advertising, MRS advertising requires en-
hanced disclosure requirements about its nature. If consumers
transact based on confusing information or make choices based on
a deliberate redirection from user-generated content to advertising,
the transactions yield suboptimal outcomes. The consumer who ex
ante sought to make decisions based on pure experiential informa-
tion often can only do so after confronting something very
different: commercial persuasion.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I explains the basics of
MRS platforms, the diversity of their business models, and why the
structure of the MRS platform can complicate matters. An MRS can
operate as a stand-alone, self-sufficient business model but can also
operate as a supportive cog in a larger system, bolstering complex
enterprises focused, for example, on search-engine or social-media
engagement. Part II begins by using information economics to de-
scribe the immense social value that this unprecedented flow of
peer experiential information brings to markets. It will also show,
however, that promoting advertising in the extraordinarily credible
context of peer-information presentation risks disruption of con-
sumer expectations in ways not readily apparent to the user. The
consumer accesses the MRS expecting to make use of peer informa-
tion yet departs the platform highly influenced by commercial
content—if the advertiser’s goals are met.
Part III explores the possibility that competitive dynamics, self-
regulation, and private litigation will resolve potential concerns
about MRS information integrity. This Part concludes that regula-
tors need to ensure that consumers have the appropriate context
for using MRS data because these market-oriented solutions still
leave consumers vulnerable. Part IV recommends that regulators
prioritize scrutiny of MRS platform advertising over other advertis-
ing contexts, due to the unique risks of confusion. Requiring
enhanced disclosure of the nature of MRS advertising content may
help contextualize the information expectations from using an
MRS. The market pushes the MRS platform to maintain credibility,
but where the consumer attributes too much credibility to the plat-
form, more complete disclosure of the nature of the advertising
helps clarify consumer expectations.
In Part V, the Article briefly concludes with a cautionary note
that MRS platforms produce a significant social good. Regulators
need to exercise care to ensure that any enhanced compliance or
disclosure requirements do not unduly burden the flow of this valu-
able information.
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I. MEDIATED REPUTATION SYSTEMS
Over the past fifteen years or so, the MRS emerged as an impor-
tant broker between “sharer” and “user.” Prominent platforms like
Yelp,9 Avvo,10 TripAdvisor,11 and Angie’s List12 formed, inducing
consumers to join communities of reviewers, voluntarily contribut-
ing to databases of experiential information about goods, services,
and providers. Multipurpose platforms such as Amazon,13
Facebook,14 and Google also aggregated and offered MRS data to
support their models.15 The lawfulness of presenting advertising
9. Yelp launched in 2004. See About Us, YELP, https://www.yelp.com/about (last visited
Oct. 17, 2017).
10. Avvo, founded in 2006, claims to have created profiles for ninety-seven percent of
the attorneys in the United States, with over one million client and peer reviews. See Avvo Fact
Sheet, AVVO, http://marketing-assets.avvo.com/media-resources/corporate-information/avvo
_fact_sheet_20160303.pdf?_ga=1.140134003.1743469121.1462394668 (last visited Oct. 17,
2017).
11. TripAdvisor launched in 2000. About TripAdvisor, TRIPADVISOR, https://
tripadvisor.mediaroom.com/us-about-us (last visited Oct. 17, 2017) (“TripAdvisor, the
world’s largest travel site . . . [w]ith more than 535 million reviews and opinions covering the
world’s largest selection of travel listings worldwide—over 7 million accommodations, air-
lines, attractions, and restaurants . . . .”).
12. Angie’s List, founded in the mid-1990s, launched online in 1999. See Angie’s List
Timeline, ANGIE’S LIST (May 21, 2012), https://www.angieslist.com/articles/angies-list-time-
line.htm. The company claims that more than three million households nationwide check
Angie’s List reviews of service providers, submitting more than 60,000 reviews every month.
About Us, ANGIE’S LIST, https://www.angieslist.com/aboutus.htm [https://web.archive.org/
web/20171017210416/https://www.angieslist.com/aboutus.htm] (last visited Oct. 17, 2017).
The company pitches to the peer experience “people who join Angie’s List are just like you
— real folks looking for a way to find trustworthy companies that perform high-quality work.”
Id.
13. One recent study of the Amazon catalog relied on 144 million customer reviews of 9
million products. Julian McAualey et al., Inferring Networks of Substitutable and Complementary
Products, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 21TH ACM SIGKDD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON KNOWL-
EDGE DISCOVERY AND DATA MINING 785, 785 (Longbing Cao & Chengqi Zhang eds.,2015),
https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2783258.
14. Facebook appears to seek close entry into Yelp’s user-location-based approach. See
Jessica Guynn, Yelp Falls 9% as Facebook Tests Local Business Reviews, USA TODAY (Dec. 15,
2015, 1:22 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2015/12/15/facebook-local-busi-
nesses-rating-yelp-angies-list/77364056/.
15. Though quantifying the magnitude of Google’s review database proves elusive, use
of the basic search function on October 19, 2017 shows reviews of varied usefulness, includ-
ing a self-described 6th grader giving a five-star review of Harvard Law School (Harvard Law
School had 177 reviews). See Shamekia Williams, Harvard Law School, GOOGLE REV., https://
www.google.com/maps/contrib/104012759808490449080/reviews/@42.3780901,-71.11884
78,17z/data=!3m1!4b1!4m3!8m2!3m1!1e1?hl=en-US (last visited Oct. 19, 2017) (screenshot
on file with author). Usage by business varies widely when comparing Google reviews to Yelp.
For example, Google aggregated 935 reviews of the In-N-Out Burger location in Mountain
View, California, while Yelp maintained only 260 reviews of that same location. In-N-Out Bur-
ger, GOOGLE REV., https://www.google.com/search?q=53+w+el+camino+in-n-out+burger+
mountain+view+ca&oq=53+w+el+camino+in-n-out+burger++mountain+view+ca&gs_l=psy-
ab.3. . .15726.19025.0.19772.19.17.2.0.0.0.117.1450.13j4.17. . . .0. . .1.1.64.psy-ab. .3.0.0. . . .0
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alongside peer reviews, is of course, not in question.16 This Article
questions whether regulators should police the presentation of this
advertising and to what extent.
If advertising compromises the MRS platform’s appearance of
neutral authenticity, users will migrate and search for useful infor-
mation elsewhere until the marginal cost of information searching
exceeds the expected return.17 Nonetheless, the MRS may succeed
at both preserving the appearance of authenticity for users and sell-
ing effective advertising to businesses. The potential for abuse
emerges when consumers visit an MRS seeking pure, authentic in-
formation, and depart the platform making a transaction altered by
exposure to persuasive content without having understood the true
and complete nature of the MRS presentation.
Put differently, users expect MRS platforms to provide access to a
trove of genuine consumer-generated experiences.18 Advertisers
pay for the opportunity to tilt that platform in their favor or pre-
empt deep access to those peer experiences by promoting their
businesses first. These advertising practices should be monitored
more carefully and with higher standards than native advertising
that appears in other apparently-authentic contexts. This is because
the MRS offers an exceptionally influential platform due to the ex-
tra credibility that users lend to peer opinion. A regulatory strategy
must preserve the flow of this valuable information, while simulta-
neously ensuring that consumers depart the platforms with the
information presentation that they expected, rather than a version
unduly disrupted or short-circuited by advertiser-generated con-
tent. Such a strategy, likely disclosure-focused, should optimize the
minimization of consumer deception and advance consumer
welfare.19
.kI60—aGfw8#lrd=0x808fb7283d63df9d:0x1f78ef5ad1ee6ee6,1,, (last visited Oct. 19, 2017)
(screenshot on file with author); In-N-Out Burger, YELP, https://www.yelp.com/biz/in-n-out-
burger-mountain-view-2 (last visited Oct. 19, 2017) (screenshot on file with author). Google,
potentially as a consolation prize for attempting, then failing, to acquire Yelp, bought the
noted and well-established restaurant peer-review publisher Zagat in 2011, as I discuss infra
Part III.A.1. See Michael J. de la Merced et al., In a Twist, Google Reviews Zagat, and Decides to
Bite, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Sept. 8, 2011, 12:05 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/
09/08/google-to-buy-zagat/?_r=0.
16. Case law appears almost devoid of any challenges to this proposition. But see
Vrydolyak v. Avvo, Inc., 2016 WL 4765716, *5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 12, 2016) (holding the First
Amendment protects Avvo’s right to present competitive advertising alongside an attorney’s
image without attorney’s consent).
17. I discuss market solutions and the obstacles to market solutions infra Part III.
18. See infra Part I.C.
19. In competitive markets with perfect information, welfare is maximized. See Benjamin
E. Hermalin, et al., Contract Law, in 1 THE HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 3, § 2.2.1 (A.
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More than ever before, MRS platforms provide consumers with
experiential information that supports everyday transactional deci-
sions.20 FTC regulation of peer endorsements and native
advertising offers no targeted guidance about the boundaries of
MRS trade practices, including how they display advertising. Appre-
ciation of the regulatory challenges requires a baseline
understanding of the important role the MRS plays in the retail
economy—and how MRS platforms function. Part I.A. shows how
MRS platforms have grown increasingly influential over consumer
transactional behavior. Part I.B. describes and differentiates, on a
basic level, the economic models that sustain MRS models.
A. The Role of the MRS in Consumer Transactions
Taken alone, the leading exemplar of an MRS-centric entity,
Yelp, shows the significant size, presence, and use of aggregated
consumer peer-review data in consumer markets.21 Yelp reports an
application presence on nearly one-third of all mobile devices in
the United States,22 hosting over 100 million consumer reviews.23
Yelp generates revenue by selling businesses local search ads, the
ability for businesses to add photos and video to their automatically-
generated pages, couponing and direct ordering buttons, and even
the ability to buy removal or de-prioritization of competitor adver-
tising.24 In addition, a staggering total of 185 million unique users
visited Yelp on average per month in the second quarter of 2017,
including 102 million unique mobile users.25 Investors received gui-
dance that Yelp’s 2016 revenue will exceed 2015, reaching $700
million, and yielding approximately $100 million in earnings.26 This
Mitchell Polinsky & Steve Shavell eds., 2007) (discussing core principles of the welfare eco-
nomics of contract); see also Scott Peppet, Freedom of Contract in an Augmented Reality: The Case
of Consumer Contracts, 59 UCLA L. REV. 676, 678–87 (2012) (discussing potential welfare gains
in retail transactions resulting from the availability of newfound digital information).
20. See infra Part I.A.
21. See YELP, INC., YELP INVESTOR PRESENTATION Q1 2016 5, 18, 34 (2016), http://www
.yelp-ir.com/static-files/0c81b4e9-d08f-443c-8625-c84893081e67 [hereinafter YELP, INVESTOR
PRESENTATION].
22. Id. at 7.
23. Id. at 8.
24. Id. at 10.
25. An Introduction to Yelp Metrics as of June 30, 2017, YELP, https://www.yelp.com/fact-
sheet [https://web.archive.org/web/20171017181107/https://www.yelp.com/factsheet]
(last visited Oct. 17, 2017).
26. Press Release, Yelp, Inc., Yelp Announces Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2015 Finan-
cial Results (Feb. 8, 2016), http://www.yelp-ir.com/news-releases/news-release-details/yelp-
announces-fourth-quarter-and-full-year-2015-financial.
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performance points to continued vindication of the MRS-centric
business model.
Factoring in Yelp’s self-identified group of competitors—which
only represent a partial set of the diverse universe of MRS plat-
forms—these entities have deeply woven themselves into the fabric
of consumer culture.27 Several dynamics amplify the importance of
peer reviews and the systems that share them. Consumers trust con-
sumer online reviews, especially consumers in the rising and newly-
dominant millennial demographic.28 The ubiquity and deep public
trust in the MRS indicates that the stakes warrant express regulatory
guidance and scrutiny.
1. Consumers Trust Online Consumer Opinions
The MRS transformed many aspects of consumer shopping in
recent years, while avoiding much regulatory attention.29 Survey
data and demographic trends indicate that the MRS will likely con-
tinue to assume a central role in guiding transactional decision
making. In 2015, The Nielsen Company published a study about
“trust in advertising,” and the results demonstrated the high level of
faith and confidence that consumers place in MRS peer data.30 Sur-
veying over thirty thousand people in sixty countries, Nielsen
concluded that “[t]he most credible advertising comes straight
from the people we know and trust.”31
Nearly fifty years ago, Phillip Nelson observed that “a consumer
can obtain information [about commercial experiences] from rela-
tives and friends, consumer magazines, or even from advertising.”32
Nelson’s observation still holds, even in the digital age. In 2015,
over eighty percent of consumers deemed the direct, non-techno-
logical, personal recommendations of friends and family
27. See YELP, INVESTOR PRESENTATION, supra note 21 at 7 (listing as Groupon,
TripAdvisor, YP Sites, FourSquare, and Angie’s List Yelp’s competitors). The satirical Com-
edy Central show, South Park, notably lampooned how America has become a nation of
amateur restaurant critics armed with smartphones. See South Park: You’re Not Yelping (Com-
cast television broadcast, Oct.14, 2015). Native advertising has also become commonplace
enough to warrant cultural commentary. See Last Week Tonight with John Oliver: Native Advertis-
ing (Comcast television broadcast, Aug. 3, 2014).
28. NIELSEN CO., GLOBAL TRUST IN ADVERTISING: WINNING STRATEGIES FOR AN EVOLVING
MEDIA LANDSCAPE 4–7 (2015).
29. Professor Eric Goldman observed that “[c]onsumer review websites are virtually un-
regulated.” Goldman, supra note 1 at 297.
30. NIELSEN CO., supra note 28, at 2.
31. Id. at 4.
32. Phillip Nelson, Information and Consumer Behavior, 78 J. POL. ECON. 311, 312 (1970).
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trustworthy.33 But as the Nielsen report observed, “trust isn’t con-
fined only to those in our inner circle.”34 Sixty-six percent of those
surveyed indicated that they trusted online consumer opinions.35
According to this Nielsen survey, reconstituted and summarized
in Table 1, trust in online consumer opinions demonstrably ex-
ceeds the trust level for most sources of information consumers use
to drive transactional decisions. This finding explains why MRS
platforms will likely enjoy continued relevance. Despite potential
authenticity issues, like the problems about Angie’s List alleged in
Moore, millions of users rely on and trust MRS information.
TABLE 1
PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS WHO TRUST ADVERTISING FORMAT
(2015 NIELSEN GLOBAL SURVEY)36
ADVERTISING FORMAT / VENUE TRUST %
Recommendations from people I know 83%
Branded websites 70%
CONSUMER OPINIONS POSTED ONLINE 66%
Editorial content, such as news articles 66%
TV, print, outdoor ads; brand sponsorships 56–63%
Emails (opt-in), TV product placement 55–56%
Ads on radio, before movies, online video 48–54%
Ads in search engine results, social networks 46–47%
Ads on mobile devices, online banners 42–42%
Text ads on mobile phones 36%
This level of trust in online consumer opinions presents a chal-
lenge to advertisers seeking to deliver messages. This still-nascent
source of information—nascent, that is, compared with traditional
well-established formats like print, outdoor advertising, radio, and
television—grants substantially less direct advertiser control, unless
the aggregators of such information offer intervention. Marketers
of goods and services, in other words, are highly motivated to find
ways to insert influence into the flow of credible MRS information.
33. NIELSEN CO., supra note 28, at 4–6.
34. Id. at 4.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 4–6. (emphasis added). Percentage reflects respondents who “completely or
somewhat trust advertising format.” Id.
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Marketers can exert influence in two primary ways: (1) by directly
inspiring or motivating users of MRS platforms to favorably review
their experiences; or (2) by purchasing a persuasive presence on
platforms where these consumers seek peer experiential
information.
Nonetheless, observers should avoid the temptation to over-mag-
nify the implications of the Nielsen survey. Despite the
comparatively high amount of trust placed in “consumer opinions
posted online,” other forms of advertising still thrive.37 Trustworthy
venues abound for reaching and persuading consumers, and some
will be more effective for reaching certain audiences with certain
offerings than others.38 Of note, a majority of consumers still ex-
press trust in AGC delivered through traditional media.39
The lower level of trust placed in social network advertising,
search-engine results, and banner advertising may also explain the
development of the MRS industry. As advertising-driven social net-
works and search engines seek to monetize their user bases, more
seemingly-trustworthy MRS platforms can prove attractive for adver-
tisers, yielding a more powerful return than banner ads, brand
sponsorships and promotions, product placements, and paid ap-
pearances alongside searches.40 Companies like Google and
Facebook have constructed and acquired MRS data content,41 per-
haps in response to consumer preference for MRS information, as
well as to attract new users and to deepen and extend engagement
from existing users.
Also of note from the Nielsen survey is the equally high level of
trust placed by consumers in independent editorial content. In the
Enforcement Policy Statement on Deceptively Formatted Advertise-
ments, the FTC expressed specific concerns about the integrity of
editorial content presentation, noting the consumer trust factor in
the authoritative editorial context surrounding certain commercial
content: “[I]f a natively formatted ad appearing as a news story is
inserted into the content stream of a publisher site that customarily
offers news and feature articles, reasonable consumers are unlikely
37. Id.
38. See generally id.
39. See generally id.
40. See id.
41. See infra Part I.B.2. After an unsuccessful attempt to acquire Yelp in 2009 for nearly a
half-billion dollars, Google acquired the well-established Zagat Reviews for $151 million in
2011. Chris Barth, Google Paid $151 Million to Get Zagat, Ditch Yelp, FORBES (Oct. 27, 2011, 1:44
PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/chrisbarth/2011/10/27/google-paid-151-million-to-get-
zagat-ditch-yelp/#798e762d4e5c.
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to recognize it as an ad.”42 If trust in online consumer opinions
proves at least as high as editorial content—looking at news web-
sites, for example—concerns about the integrity of MRS
presentation should expressly rise to the same level.
Perhaps more important than mere expressions of “trust,” the Niel-
sen survey shows elsewhere that buyers express a high likelihood of
acting on information from consumer opinions posted online.43 Of
all of the nineteen advertising avenues listed in Table 1, respon-
dents deemed “consumer opinions posted on line” as the format
third most likely to lead them to take action, only behind personal
recommendations and branded websites.44
Not only do online peer opinions influence consumer action,
they disproportionately influence the most valuable emergent dem-
ographic age group: millennials.45 This group’s increased
purchasing power,46 along with the power of the soon-to-mature
“Digital Natives” in Generation Z,47 indicate that the MRS will con-
tinue to play a key role in the retail economy.
2. Millennials Trust Online Consumer Opinions More
The Pew Research Center includes in the millennial generation
“those born after 1980 and the first generation to come of age in
the new millennium.”48 By 2015, according to the Census Bureau,
the millennial population exceeded that of Baby Boomers.49 Like
the Baby Boomers of a generation ago, millennials have become a
42. FTC Enforcement Policy Statement on Deceptively Formatted Advertisements, 81
Fed. Reg. 22596, 22600 (Apr. 18, 2016).
43. NIELSEN CO., supra note 28, at 8.
44. Id.
45. See Christine Barton et. al, How Millennials Are Changing the Face of Marketing Forever,
BCG.PERSPECTIVES (Jan. 15, 2014), https://www.bcgperspectives.com/content/articles/mar-
keting_center_consumer_customer_insight_how_millennials_changing_marketing_forever/
(establishing the current and future importance of properly addressing the millennial cohort
from the standpoint of a marketer).
46. Steve Henderson, Spending Habits by Generation, U.S. DEP’T. LAB. BLOG (Nov. 3,
2016), https://blog.dol.gov/2016/11/03/spending-habits-by-generation.
47. Alex Williams, Move Over, Millennials, Here Comes Generation Z, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 18,
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/20/fashion/move-over-millennials-here-comes-
generation-z.html?mcubz=0&_r=0 (describing attributes of “the generation born after millen-
nials” and how that generation “is emerging as the next big thing for market researchers,
cultural observers and trend forecasters . . . .”)
48. Pew Research Ctr., Topic: Millennials, http://www.pewresearch.org/topics/millenni-
als/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2017).
49. See Richard Fry, Millennials Overtake Baby Boomers as America’s Largest Generation, PEW
RES. CTR.: FACT TANK (Apr. 25, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/04/25/
millennials-overtake-baby-boomers/.
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considerable economic force in American demography and in the
setting of consumer market trends. Their information sourcing
habits reflect their comfort with technology. Millennials interact
with media differently than older generations, “exercising greater
control over when and where they watch, listen and read content—
and on which device.”50
Millennials trust most of the sources of information in Table 1
more than other generations—and seventy percent say that they
“completely or somewhat trust” consumer online opinions.51 In
comparison, a mere forty-seven percent of the Silent Generation
(age over 65) places that level of trust in consumer online
opinions.52
Another 2015 survey, co-sponsored by Forbes, reaffirms these con-
clusions, revealing that Millennials acquire market information and
engage differently with advertising, marketing, and promotions.53
Only one percent of millennials indicated (or admitted) that a
“compelling advertisement would make them trust a brand more,”
while nearly one-third declared that they “[relied] mostly on blogs
before . . . purchase.”54 As millennials accumulate more purchasing
power, the future points toward a consumer environment more en-
thusiastically reliant on MRS data.
The value of this MRS data and the associated economic power
of MRS users have been neatly monetized by MRS platforms and
their advertising clients. Accepting Yelp’s representations, MRS ad-
vertisers have found their return on investment to substantially
surpass that of other advertising models.55 This attractive return for
advertisers, however, offers significant evidence of a conflict be-
tween serving advertising clients alongside this increasingly
important type of authentic information-seeking audience. The
MRS, in order to profit from the neutral platform, must manage a
tension between generating opportunities for favorable advertiser
treatment and preserving the appearance of informational integrity
and trustworthiness for users.
The natural tendency to trust friends and relatives spills over into
online reviews, but this trust is somewhat unwarranted, given the
50. NIELSEN CO., supra note 28, at 12.
51. Id at 13.
52. Id. (as labeled and defined by Nielsen).
53. Dan Schawbel, 10 New Findings About the Millennial Consumer, FORBES (Jan. 20, 2015,
8:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/danschawbel/2015/01/20/10-new-findings-about-
the-millennial-consumer/#593676db6c8f.
54. Id.
55. YELP, INVESTOR PRESENTATION, supra note 21, at 11.
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commercialization activities of the MRS platforms. The “appear-
ance” of information integrity and “information integrity” describe
very different things: the former proves necessary to retain and en-
gage users, and, as an examination of the MRS business models
show, some deviation from perfection with the latter proves a neces-
sary evil to attract advertisers.
B. The MRS Business Model
An MRS must provide return on investment to those who build a
credible, attractive, and useful platform,56 presenting the user data
to the public in an appealing format. Several MRS business models
have emerged, but in the interest of balancing simplicity with rigor,
this Article focuses on two archetypes—the “stand-alone” MRS that
relies heavily on advertising and subscription revenue, and the “sup-
portive” MRS that attracts and engages users with a much larger
platform for facilitating or brokering sales. Each MRS has unique
attributes and some are a hybrid of these two archetypes.57
The stand-alone MRS archetype includes entities like Yelp,
Angie’s List, TripAdvisor, and Avvo. These entities primarily, but
not entirely, engage in the business of offering aggregated reviews,
largely depending on advertising and commission revenue from re-
viewed parties.58 The supportive MRS archetype includes Amazon,
which, among other wide-ranging sets of activities, collects and
presents reviews on products it sells,59 and Facebook and Google,
both of which use MRS platforms, among many other mechanisms,
to support broad campaigns to engage users.
56. Unless functioning as a nonprofit, not an MRS, but an independent tester and re-
viewer, Consumer Reports “[f]ormed as an independent, nonprofit organization . . . [and]
serves consumers through unbiased product testing and ratings, research, journalism, public
education, and advocacy.” See Our Mission, CONSUMERSUNION, http://consumersunion.org/
about/mission/ [https://web.archive.org/web/20171017203320/http://consumersunion
.org/about/mission/] (last visited Oct. 17, 2017). As the respected journalism industry blog,
Romanesko, reported, the Consumer Reports nonprofit model appears to have financially
struggled in part due to aging reader demographics. Jim Romanesko, ‘Change is Hard’: Con-
sumer Reports Restructures to Survive in the Digital Era, JIMROMANESKO.COM (Oct. 30, 2013),
http://jimromenesko.com/2013/10/30/change-is-hard-consumer-reports-restructures-to-
survive-in-the-digital-era/
57. I previously identified these two platform archetypes but did not offer much in the
way of specifics or insights yielded from discussing a variety of specific business models, as I
do in substantial detail here. See Friedman, Addressing Commercialization, supra note 4, at
76–79.
58. See infra Part B.1.
59. See Friedman, Addressing Commercialization, supra note 4 at 78 (briefly discussing role
of MRS in Amazon model).
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Both the stand-alone and supportive MRS models draw users to
offer reviews in order to create a valuable platform for users, adver-
tisers, and ultimately, investors. Both models cultivate communities
to share experiences. The models diverge, however, in the way they
extract value from the MRS. The stand-alone MRS uses the plat-
form as the primary direct launching pad for revenue generation.
This sets up a complex tension between reaching the requisite au-
thenticity bar for users and producing a worthwhile financial return
for both advertisers and platform owners. The supportive MRS, on
the other hand, may not encounter as much of this tension because
the MRS constitutes only a piece of a much larger, integrated user
engagement model.
Below, the basic models employed by players in each archetype
are described, demonstrating that the “stand-alone” MRS platforms
by necessity must compromise authenticity but can do so impercep-
tibly. In comparison, the “supportive” MRS platforms have less
pressure to compromise the authenticity of peer information, even
if there are immediate advantages to so doing. Thus, adding an
MRS as a feature that attracts overall users may bring all the value a
broader platform like Google requires.
In addition, some non-exhaustive examples and illustrations of
the different business models in this unique sector are offered to
provide insight into the ways some models present more challenges
to authenticity preservation than others. This Article focuses heavily
on primary players, on the premise that they broadly stand in as
representatives of the sector.
1. The Standalone Mediated Reputation System
A host of entities fit the description of the stand-alone MRS, solic-
iting advertising support while trying to present the aura of
neutrality to attract consumers. A few stand-alone MRS models are
described here, dissecting their strategies for generating a financial
return on their accumulation and presentation of consumer re-
views, and showing why these models should receive more express
regulatory guidance.
Yelp, as noted, represents the quintessential MRS platform, main-
taining reviews of local businesses.60 Angie’s List collects reviews for
a different set of service providers, mostly in the household home
services field but now also in the medical provider zone.61 For years,
60. See infra Part I.B.1(a).
61. See infra Part I.B.2(b).
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Angie’s List relied on a subscription-based, user-funded model, but
by 2016, found that model financially nonviable. It then opened up
more free content to the public,62 which ultimately has led to a po-
tential sale of the company.63 TripAdvisor focuses on the retail
travel sector, enabling review of travel-related sites and generating
revenue related to that audience, but faces strategic challenges as it
attempts to transform itself from a review publisher into a travel
broker.64 Avvo, a platform for accumulating and disseminating cli-
ent (peer) evaluations of lawyers,65 sources financial support from
their reviewed subjects, as well as from offering users do-it-yourself
legal solutions.66 According to a (methodologically opaque) Avvo
survey, ninety-five percent of legal consumers indicate that “client
reviews matter.”67
The following sample of stand-alone MRS entities merely repre-
sents a slice of a complex sub-industry involving a variety of systems.
The business model for each relies on extracting revenue without
compromising the appearance of integrity that makes the platform
attractive to visit and use. The true consumer transactional experi-
ence, however, may reflect what is not apparent to them—how the
MRS used peer information to expose them to persuasive AGC.
62. See Brad Tuttle, Angie’s List Just Announced a Huge Change, FORTUNE (Mar. 3, 2016),
http://fortune.com/2016/03/03/angies-list-subscription/.
63. On May 1, 2017, Angie’s List, in agreeing to an acquisition by the owner of its com-
petitor, HomeAdvisor, may have “acknowledged a painful truth: People prefer finding their
home service providers on another (free) website.” James Briggs & Holly V. Hays, Angie’s List
to be Acquired by HomeAdvisor Parent Company, USA TODAY (May 2, 2017, 12:14 PM), https://
www.usatoday.com/story/money/nation-now/2017/05/02/angies-list-acquired-homeadvi
sor-parent-company/308711001/.
64. See infra Part I.B.2(c).
65. See John Cook, Legal Marketplace Avvo Accelerates with $37.5M, Eyes International Expan-
sion and New Products, GEEKWIRE (Apr. 15, 2014, 4:31 AM), http://www.geekwire.com/2014/
legal-advice-startup-avvo-scores-37-5m-eyes-international-expansion/.
66. About Avvo, Inc., AVVO, http://marketing-assets.avvo.com/media-resources/corpo-
rate-information/avvo_fact_sheet_20160303.pdf?_ga=1.252734153.1927918501.1477886519
(last visited Oct. 17, 2017).
67. AVVO, INC., THE NEW LEGAL CONSUMER IS 1 (2015), http://marketing-assets.avvo
.com/media-resources/avvo-research/2016/avvo_research_new_legal_consumer_infograph
ic_2016.pdf?_ga=1.56648682.1927918501.1477886519 (emphasis added). Cassandra Burke
Robertson contends that Avvo and third-party peer ratings may prove less susceptible to “the
risk of promoting a false sense of reliability” than if attorney evaluations emerged from an
official source. Given that attorneys are highly-regulated service providers, expansive public
alternatives to private MRS systems could exist. Cassandra Burke Robertson, Online Reputation
Management in Attorney Regulation, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 97, 134–35 (2015). Official author-
ity could trump peer authority but both have power.
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a. Yelp
As noted, Yelp holds a strong position as a stand-alone MRS “con-
nect[ing] people and great local businesses.”68 In 2015, Yelp relied
on local and brand advertising for eighty-eight percent of total reve-
nue,69 selling businesses access to the peer-review platform. Yelp
reported to investors that local advertisers enjoyed a robust 269 per-
cent return on investment on their purchased presence on the
platform.70 Yelp helps advertisers generate this return by attracting
consumers with peer-experience information, then placing paid
content amidst this information.71
Yelp crisply describes the company’s value proposition. The Yelp
“platform provides value to consumers and businesses alike by con-
necting consumers with great local businesses at the critical
moment when they are deciding where to spend their money.”72 As
discussed infra Part I.A., Yelp’s user and revenue base—and profit-
ability—reflect a successful business model. Nonetheless, Yelp’s
own description of its model demonstrates the balance that an MRS
must strike in leveraging neutral information into revenue genera-
tion. Yelp identifies four “key strengths” of their platform: (1)
discovery; (2) engagement; (3) advertising; and (4) transactions.73
Discovery describes the way Yelp functions as a search engine vehi-
cle for consumers looking for businesses. Yelp claims that their
“platform is transforming the way people discover local businesses.”74
Engagement describes Yelp’s view of how consumers contribute
content and how businesses can pay for the opportunity to interact
with these consumers. Yelp encourages “consumers to share their
everyday local business experiences, through reviews, tips, photos
and videos, and engage directly with businesses . . . .”75 For exam-
ple, businesses can (and do) pay Yelp to get an advantage over
those who do not pay to participate in the platform, though some
basic services are free.76 Businesses can “ ‘claim’ the Yelp business
68. Press Release, Yelp, Inc., supra note 26.
69. See Yelp, Inc., Annual Report at 5 (Form 10-K) (Feb. 24, 2016).
70. YELP, INVESTOR PRESENTATION, supra note 21, at 10.
71. See Yelp, Inc., Annual Report, supra note 69, at 1 (“[User] contributors provide rich,
firsthand information about local businesses . . . . Each review, tip, photo and video expands
the breadth and depth of the content on our platform, which drives a powerful network
effect: the expanded content draws in more consumers and more prospective contribu-
tors . . . . [T]his network effect underpins our ability to deliver clicks and ad impressions to
advertisers.”).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. (emphasis added).
75. Id.
76. Id.
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listing page for each of their locations . . . [and] enhance the page
with additional information about their business and respond to
reviews . . . .”77 The free business services present less of a data in-
tegrity temptation because all businesses have equal access to the
free part of the platform—and allowing businesses to participate
may enhance and clarify user experience information.78
Advertising on the Yelp website and mobile app platform provides
Yelp’s lifeblood—its primary source of revenue.79 Yelp offers the op-
portunity for businesses to promote themselves through paid
“premium services” to their “large audience of purchase intent-
driven consumers . . . using targeted search advertising, discounted
offers and . . . enhancements to their business listing pages.”80 Yelp
recently phased out national advertising to focus on garnering reve-
nue from local advertising.81 Finally, the company also enables
transactions by “providing consumers with a continuous experience
from discovery to completion of transactions such as ordering food
through a local delivery service and booking spa appointments.”82
The concepts of advertising and “promotion” muddles the im-
plicitly authentic attributes of the MRS. The sale of a “promotion”
to a business literally enables the business to enjoy “promotion”
over non-paying businesses on a platform perceived as authentic.
The challenge for an MRS like Yelp is to both provide returns to
advertisers and maintain credibility to perpetuate the viability of the
“discovery” and “engagement” parts of the platform.
Yelp expressly recognizes the operational challenge of generat-
ing strong user engagement and a vibrant network of users, while at
the same time commercializing access to the network to sell to ad-
vertisers. The first section of Yelp’s Annual Report informs investors
that “[Community contributions underpin] our ability to deliver
77. Id.
78. For contrast, consider the business model of the MRS ConsumerAffairs, where busi-
nesses pay for the ability to interact with consumer reviews on its platforms:
A company that displays the ConsumerAffairs Accredited Seal has agreed to work with
[ConsumerAffairs] to resolve consumer complaints. In exchange for a monthly fee,
[ConsumerAffairs] provide[s] ConsumerAffairs Accredited companies with certain in-
formation regarding consumer reviews and complaints and allow ConsumerAffairs
Accredited companies to respond privately or publicly to the consumer.
What is ConsumerAffairs for Brands?, CONSUMERAFFAIRS, https://www.consumeraffairs.com/
about/faq/#what-is-consumeraffairs-for-brands [https://web.archive.org/web/2017101720
5811/https://www.consumeraffairs.com/about/faq/] (last visited Oct. 17, 2017).
79. See Yelp, Inc., Annual Report, supra note 69, at 1.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. (“In February 2015, [Yelp] acquired Eat24Hours.com, Inc., or Eat24, a leading
online food ordering service . . . .”).
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clicks and ad impressions to advertisers. Increases in these metrics
improve our value proposition . . . . For this reason, we . . . make the
consumer experience our highest priority.”83 Yelp also notes that
content metrics and user traffic metrics “improve [Yelp’s] value
proposition to local businesses as they seek easy-to-use and effective
advertising solutions.”84
The challenge for regulators is to ensure that whatever state an
MRS achieves to make the “network effect” work for them,85 the
platform does not unduly distort the presentation of information.
Advertising intends to persuade and yield favorable action. The
purpose of promotional advertising is to divert the consumer to-
ward transacting with the promoters. In this context, however,
regulators should have extra concern about the contextual presen-
tation of the message.
Consumers visit Yelp to “discover” and “engage.” They may de-
part from their platform visit having made decisions based more on
AGC (or redirection to AGC) than on the product of pure peer
data. Consumers may believe that they have drawn upon a pure dis-
tillation of peer experiences, but the AGC, by design, attempts to
interrupt that process.
b. Other Standalone MRS Players.
Yelp exemplifies the dependence of standalone players on plat-
form advertising revenue: eighty-eight percent. Yelp presents AGC
in the context of user-generated content. Other standalone entities
demonstrate a similar level of reliance on revenue tied closely to an
MRS platform. A brief sampling of other standalone models con-
firms the presence of this business model.
i. Angie’s List
Angie’s List, a company that has traditionally relied on a base of
paid subscribers sharing reviews, boasts of serving three million
households, offering “reviews to find the best local service provid-
ers.”86 The company claims that “[t]he people who join Angie’s List
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. About Us, ANGIE’S LIST, supra note 12.
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are just like you—real folks looking for a way to find trustworthy
companies that perform high-quality work.”87
The Angie’s List model continues to migrate from membership-
subscription based revenues toward an openly-accessible platform,
supported by advertising and promotions.88 Angie’s List still collects
nominal fees from some subscribers.89 In 2010, Angie’s List sourced
fifty-seven percent of its revenue from “service providers,”90 increas-
ing to eighty percent in 2015, reflecting the model’s migration away
from consumer subscriptions.91
ii. TripAdvisor
TripAdvisor focuses on an entirely different sector and set of
transaction decisions, cultivating travel enthusiasts. TripAdvisor “of-
fers advice from real travelers and a wide variety of travel choices
and planning features with seamless links to booking tools that
check hundreds of websites to find the best hotel prices.
TripAdvisor branded sites make up the largest travel community in
the world . . . .”92
TripAdvisor monetizes access to this community of its creation.
This MRS relies on click and display-based advertising for seventy-
five percent of total revenue, sourcing sixty-four percent of total
revenue from “click-based advertising.”93 The company defines this
as including payments related to linking to external booking sites
like online travel agencies, hotels and airlines, and “contextually-
relevant branded and unbranded text links.”94
When users seek peer information on TripAdvisor, they confront
a mixture of community reviews and advertising from travel services
providers. The appearance of TripAdvisor advertising results from a
bidding process to promote the advertisers’ rates and availability on
the site. “Bids are submitted periodically . . . and the size of the bid
87. Id.
88. See Tuttle, supra note 62.
89. How Does Angie’s List Make Money?, ANGIE’S LIST (Nov. 20, 2015), https://web.archive
.org/web/20160103221125/http://www.angieslist.com:80/faq/how-does-angie-s-list-make-
money/ (the source is a web archive a previous version of a page on the Angie’s List site) .
90. Angie’s List, Inc., Annual Report at 3 (Form 10-K) (Feb. 25, 2013).
91. Angie’s List, Inc., Annual Report at 14 (Form 10-K) (Mar. 8, 2016).
92. Press Release, TripAdvisor, Inc., TripAdvisor Announces Instant Booking Agree-
ment with Expedia, Inc. (Dec. 20, 2016), http://ir.tripadvisor.com/releasedetail.cfm?release
id=1004961.
93. TripAdvisor, Inc., Annual Report at 3 (Form 10-K (Feb. 18, 2016); see also id. at 3–4
(showing revenue sixty-four percent of revenue coming from click-based advertising and
eleven percent of revenue coming from display-based advertising).
94. Id.
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relative to other bids received determines the partner’s placement
in all metasearch placements on our site with one or more offers
shown, including hotel comparison search results and the property
detail page.”95 The aggressive bidders increase their visibility on this
site that leads with the premise of “offer[ing] advice from real trav-
elers” with the direct ability to transact.96
The system is automated and the size of the partner’s bid is the
only factor impacting the partner’s placementon that page, ex-
cept that individual partners may be sorted lower in the event
that they have not provided price information or if they cease
to have availability for the property.97
This revenue stream also includes commissions when users com-
plete a reservation on TripAdvisor.
TripAdvisor attributes another eleven percent of revenue to “dis-
play-based advertising,” which enables advertisers to “promote their
brands in a contextually-relevant manner through a variety of dis-
play-based [website] advertising placements . . . .”98 Over the past
few years, TripAdvisor’s approach has gradually shifted from a click-
and-display revenue model toward the offering of specialized pro-
motion services to hospitality providers.99
iii. Avvo
Avvo, the attorney-sector MRS platform,100 built and maintains a
community of lawyers, some of whom answer basic questions for lay
users, while maintaining a community of users who review law-
yers.101 Avvo sources revenue in part from attorney advertising,
commercial messaging which would attempt to trump or redirect a
user away from authentic search results. Lawyers spend as little as
$100 per month on advertising to as much as “ten[s] of thousands”
95. Id.
96. See Press Release, TripAdvisor, Inc., supra note 92.
97. TripAdvisor, Inc., Annual Report at 3 (Form 10-K) (Feb. 28, 2016).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 4. The fastest growing share of TripAdvisor’s revenue comes from “subscrip-
tion-based” and “transaction-based” sources. These are mostly flat fee services enabling
“hotels, B&Bs and other specialty lodging properties” to list contact information and special
offers. Id.
100. For a thorough analysis of the unique challenges faced by the legal profession in
addressing online reputation management, see generally Robertson, supra note 67.
101. See About Avvo, Inc., supra note 66.
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of people,102 certainly expecting a return. Additionally, Avvo profits
from brokering certain fixed-fee services offered by lawyers.103
Unlike the previous three players discussed, Avvo remains a pri-
vately-held company, which makes the business model more
difficult to dissect, particularly on revenue sources and profitability.
However, Avvo appears to have been enjoying success as measured
through a fundraising valuation in 2015 that rendered the company
three times more valuable than the well-established Angie’s List.104
Avvo’s CEO reported that “the [Avvo] model is working, with tre-
mendous consumer benefit as well as ‘great lawyers getting more
business.’ ”105 Presumptively, the lawyers who advertise amongst and
amidst the Avvo peer-review content are these “great lawyers.” As
the CEO put it, “[f]rom the beginning, [Avvo] focused on building
a high-quality and trusted community,”106 which makes it a naturally
valuable piece of virtual real estate for exposing consumers in need
of services to commercial content offering those services.
These advertising-dependent platforms attempt to draw in users
with an express pitch that they offer a repository of authentic con-
sumer reviews of experiences. Yelp may not make direct claims of
authenticity, but the above-mentioned description to investors
reveals the centrality of the use of authentic reviews to support their
model.
a. The Promotion of Review Authenticity to Lure and Engage Users
Presenting credible, authentic reviews lies at “the heart of [Yelp’s
business]” through “vibrant communities of contributors . . . [who]
provide rich, firsthand information about local businesses . . . .
Each review . . . expands the breadth and depth of the content on
our platform, which . . . draws in more consumers and more pro-
spective contributors.”107 As discussed in Part III, Yelp takes strong
measures to preserve the true integrity of data and draws sharp
lines about what advertisers can influence through content. The
102. Cook, supra note 65.
103. See About Avvo, Inc., supra note 66.
104. See Spencer Soper, Legal Website Avvo Valued at $650 Million in Funding Round, BLOOM-
BERG TECH. (July 28, 2015, 7:30 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-07-
28/legal-website-avvo-valued-at-650-million-in-funding-round.
105. Cook, supra note 65.
106. Id.
107. Yelp, Inc., Annual Report, supra note 69 at 1.
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question is whether these quality-control efforts are enough to pro-
tect the consumer from leaving the platform with a misimpression
of the nature of the user experience.
Through its own advertising, Angie’s List expressly emphasizes to
users that it assumes the role of neutral arbiter. This can be seen in
Angie’s List video advertisements.108 One asked, “Want feedback
that’s unbiased? We’ve got 10 million verified reviews . . . Join
Angie’s List for free.”109 Another commercial emphasized,
“[E]veryone has access to our real reviews that we actually ver-
ify . . . . So if you need a great plumber, find one at Angie’s List.”110
The message that “[the] people who join Angie’s List are just like
you—real folks . . . .” rounds out a collection of representations that
could leave a reasonable user to conclude that when they use
Angie’s List, they are receiving an authentic sample of genuine con-
sumer experiences with service providers.111
TripAdvisor, boasting status as “the world’s largest travel site,”112
emphasizes UGC expression of reviews, advice, and opinions in its
value proposition to users on their way to transacting. “Browse over
435 million candid reviews, opinions, and photos of hotels, restau-
rants, attractions, and more—all by travelers like you. You’ll also
find low airfares, free travel guides, worldwide vacation rental list-
ings, popular forums with advice about virtually every destination,
and more.”113 Based on these claims, TripAdvisor users should ex-
pect an authentic travel search experience. After the travel
recession following 9/11, TripAdvisor permanently pivoted from
“white label search engine” to a user-review driven model. The ap-
proach requires availability of “fresh, authentic content” to drive
traffic toward click-through, commission-driven revenue flows.114
TripAdvisor’s express strategic positioning invites consumers to
enter transactions with the lure of authenticity. As with Yelp, main-
taining this balance proves critical to success.
108. See, e.g.,  Angie’s List, Office Banter, YouTube (Aug. 8, 2016), https://www.youtube
.com/watch?v=4ZC94C1Ni-Q; Angie’s List, What Goes Down, YouTube (June 24, 2016),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CKpBfmtX3ME
109. Angie’s List, Office Banter, supra note 108.
110. Angie’s List, What Goes Down, supra note 108.
111. See About Us, Angie’s List, supra note 12 (“The people who join Angie’s List are just
like you—real folks looking for a way to find trustworthy companies that perform high-qual-
ity work.”).
112. See About TripAdvisor, supra note 11.
113. See https://www.tripadvisor.com/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2017) (screen capture on file
with author).
114. See Jeff Bussgang, The Secrets to TripAdvisor’s Impressive Scale, HARVARD. BUS. REV. (Oct.
2, 2012), https://hbr.org/2012/10/the-secrets-to-tripadvisors-im.
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For perspective, the 2015 combined total revenue of Yelp,
Angie’s List, and TripAdvisor represents merely thirteen percent of
Facebook’s total revenue.115 This fact is presented to demonstrate
that if Facebook alone, which already internally maintains a sup-
portive MRS, swallowed any or all of these entities, the MRS-driven
component would only represent a small portion of the revenue
stream. Facebook’s top advertisers seek the general user engage-
ment but tend toward national brands seeking to tie into user
interests, rather than tying into reviews of their own businesses.116
Additionally, Facebook’s hefty profitability would dwarf that of the
three entities combined, both in margins and sheer total. At a
broad level, an entity with Facebook’s scale and scope relies more
on broader brand advertising revenue drawn to the ability to target
Facebook’s user profiles, while also benefiting from viral effects.
Generally, users approach Google, Facebook, and Amazon with
broader motivations than the gathering of peer reviews and infor-
mation, which puts less pressure on these entities to embed
advertising in MRS information delivery.
2. The Supportive Mediated Reputation System.
Like standalone platforms, all supportive platforms differ, but
generalizations emerge about their attributes. Facebook provides a
prime example of a larger entity hosting an MRS without relying on
the MRS as a primary springboard for selling advertising.
Facebook’s mission serves grander ambitions than the sharing of
reviews: “to give people the power to build community and bring
the world closer together . . . . [For users] to stay connected with
friends and family, to discover what’s going on in the world, and to
share and express what matters to them.”117
Facebook’s invitation “to connect” and “discover” dominates user
expectations, and the gathered audience proves attractive to major
brand advertisers. UGC reviews within an entity like Facebook play
only a supportive role in engaging users to use the platform for
more connection and interaction. The big-ticket sales that drive
115. Yelp had revenue of $550 million, Angie’s List $344 million, TripAdvisor, $1.5 bil-
lion, Facebook, $18 billion. See Angie’s List, Inc., Annual Report, supra note 91, at 29;
Facebook, Inc., Annual Report at 30 (Form 10-K) (Jan. 28, 2016); TripAdvisor Annual Re-
port, supra note 97, at 29; Yelp, Inc., Annual Report, supra note 69, at 41.
116. See Jim Edwards, These Are the 35 Biggest Advertisers on Facebook, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 28,
2013, 12:19 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/top-advertisers-on-facebook-2013-11.
117. Company Info, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM, http://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/
[https://web.archive.org/web/20171018030033/https://newsroom.fb.com/company-in
fo/] (last visited Oct. 17, 2017).
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Facebook’s revenue have only an indirect relationship to the MRS,
which again, serves as a mere cog in a larger interactive system.
Like Facebook, other broad platforms use “supportive” MRS plat-
forms as a secondary mechanism to make the overall user
experience more useful and engaging. Google and Amazon gather
and host consumer previews of businesses, goods, and services.118
Google Ad Words are promoted alongside the feature that allows
businesses (for free) to respond to Google consumer reviews.119
Generally, Google tries to preserve the quality of the search-engine
user experience while optimizing the return to advertisers:
We asked, what if ads weren’t intrusive and annoying? What if
we could deliver a relevant ad at just the right time and give
people useful commercial information? What if we could pro-
vide products that allow for better attribution and
measurement across screens so that we show great ads for the
right people?120
In its securities filings, Google does not discuss the role of peer con-
sumer reviews in the overall business model. Instead, Google
declares a focus on gathering revenue from “performance advertis-
ing” and “brand advertising.”121 “Performance advertising” focuses
on creation and delivery of click-through ads, leading to direct en-
gagement with advertisers.122 Brand advertising “enhances users’
awareness of and affinity with advertisers’ products and services,
through videos, text, images, and other ads that run across various
devices.”123 These descriptions imply, although concededly through
omission, that Google does not materially depend on advertising
embedded in peer-review content.
Amazon presents an entirely different model, as a direct seller
and broker of goods and services, and as a host to retail outlets. In
1997, Amazon CEO Jeff Bezos mentioned reviews briefly in his an-
nual letter to shareholders. At that point, still focused on
bookselling, Amazon “maintained a dogged focus on improving the
118. See About Customer Reviews, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/
display.html/ref=hp_left_v4_sib?ie=UTF8&nodeId=201967050, (last visited Oct. 17, 2017);
Google Maps Help, GOOGLE MAPS, https://support.google.com/maps/answer/6230175?co=
GENIE.Platform%3DDesktop&hl=en (last visited Oct. 17, 2017) (Google, like Yelp, collects
local reviews with geolocation features.)
119. See Read and Reply to Reviews, GOOGLE MY BUS. HELP, https://support.google.com/
business/answer/3474050?hl=en (last visited Oct. 17, 2017).
120. Alphabet, Inc., Annual Report at 2 (Form 10-K) (Feb. 11, 2016).
121. Id. at 2–3.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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shopping experience . . . substantially enhanc[ing] [its] store . . .
offer[ing] customers gift certificates, 1-Click[ ] shopping, and vastly
more reviews, content, browsing options, and recommendation fea-
tures.”124 Nearly twenty years later, reviews received no mention in
the Amazon annual report, which described an audacious, sweep-
ing business model that served businesses and consumers.125
Clearly, although the platform uses peer-review content, it does not
center on it.126
For all of these entities, however, MRS information does not
drive revenue in the way that it does for Yelp, Angie’s List, and
TripAdvisor nor does MRS information serve as the primary bait for
users. Isolating the role that MRS components play within these
supportive entities proves difficult to break out because the MRS
platform performs merely an auxiliary function. Nonetheless, for
larger entities that do not rely on the MRS data to draw in users to
view embedded advertising, integrity of MRS data presentation
might prove less difficult to preserve. For a standalone MRS, how-
ever, the MRS data becomes the primary means of commercializing
the platform.
Due to their sheer size, the practices of supportive MRS plat-
forms certainly warrant scrutiny. In spite of their orbital position
with respect to the core business model, reviews are viewed
widely,127 and could be tempting targets for manipulation. Com-
pared with standalone platforms, though, concerns about
authenticity on supportive platforms should be secondary, as the
former entities are strikingly less dependent on integration of UGC
with AGC.
Painting the landscape of this complex MRS industry, subindus-
try, or function proves challenging. Having this foundation,
however, enables explanation of the unique challenges that this
newly-emergent information channel presents to consumers and
regulators. No other form of advertising has ever blended sepa-
rately-established concerns about the power of peer influence and
124. Letter from Jeff Bezos, Founder and Chief Exec. Officer, Amazon.com, Inc. to the
Shareholders at Amazon.com, Inc. (1997), http://media.corporate-ir.net/media_files/irol/
97/97664/reports/Shareholderletter97.pdf.
125. See Amazon.com, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Jan. 29, 2016).
126. See Amazon Customer Reviews, supra note 118.
127. For example, Facebook’s maneuvers and innovations in this review space indicate
heavy activity on business review pages (and growth). For a snapshot of Facebook’s position
at the end of 2015, see Sara Perez, Facebook Takes On Angie’s List And Yelp With New Site for
Finding Top-Rated Local Businesses, TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 15, 2015), https://techcrunch.com/
2015/12/15/facebook-takes-on-angies-list-and-yelp-with-new-site-for-finding-top-rated-local-
businesses/.
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the power associated with embedding advertising in authoritative
contexts.
II. ADVERTISING AND REVIEWS:
THE POWER OF PEERS AND ADVERTISING CONTEXT
MRS-platform advertising sits squarely in the overlapping
shadows of two recent FTC concerns. One major concern encom-
passes the misuse of peer information. The other, the misleading
use of contextual advertising. However, neither of these concerns
have been applied to the MRS.
Peer-information concerns have focused on the advertiser’s use
of peer endorsements to create inflated expectations about con-
sumer experience.128 Likewise, contextual-advertising concerns
have focused on “native advertising” and the potential for consum-
ers to confuse AGC with news reporting, for example.129 With MRS-
platform advertising, though, advertising context can prove excep-
tionally powerful because of the identified power (and draw) of
peer information, as well as the consumer’s “readiness to transact”
based on the MRS information.130
MRS platforms have generated a wave of robust peer experience
information, and Part II.A. uses well-established principles of infor-
mation economics to explain the exceptional power of this
information. Noting that regulators have already expressed concern
about misuse of this power, this part discusses the regulatory steps
that the FTC has taken to address advertiser use of peer endorse-
ments. The power of peer experiential information has long been
formally recognized and has been addressed in other regulatory
guidance. Ironically, it has not been addressed in this context,
where peer-experiences have been uniquely commercialized. In
light of the heavy reliance of the standalone MRS on platform-
based commercial revenue, Part II.B. describes the FTC’s concerns
128. See Guides Concerning the Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising, 16
C.F.R. § 255.0 (2016).
129. See FTC Enforcement Policy Statement on Deceptively Formatted Advertisements, 81
Fed. Reg. 22596, 22596–98 (Apr. 18, 2016). This policy has longer roots. See Advisory Op. No.
191, Advertisements Which Appear in News Format, 73 F.T.C. 1307 (1968).
130. In 2013, Yelp publicized to advertisers a self-commissioned Nielsen study revealing
that eighty-two percent of Yelp users say they visit the site when “intend[ing] to buy a product
or service.” Nielsen: 4 out of 5 Yelp Users Visit the Site when Preparing to Spend Money, YELP OFFI-
CIAL BLOG (June 25, 2013), https://www.yelpblog.com/2013/06/nielsen-4-out-of-5-yelp-
users-visit-the-site-when-preparing-to-spend-money-at-a-local-business. Sixty-seven percent
make a purchase decision within a few days. Id. Also of note, in 2013, Google—far and
away—was Yelp’s closest competitor for user engagement. See id.
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about native advertising, and the Commission’s accompanying reg-
ulatory prescription. Most notably, in this area where the context of
peer information proves most powerful for generating user atten-
tion, MRS-targeted enforcement guidance proves almost absent.
Part II.B. also emphasizes that MRS platforms use powerful peer-
generated information as a device for establishing contextual credi-
bility for advertisers to influence the universe of MRS users.
MRS platform advertising rests at the epicenter of these two re-
cently-addressed concerns: the misuse of the power of peer
information to influence consumers and the consumer confusion
resulting from advertising placed in credible contexts. The role of
peer information in consumer decision-making can explain the
power of peer information.
A. The Power of Peer Experiential Information
Technology has made this recent explosion (and accessibility) of
peer-information data possible. Of course, this explosion of infor-
mation availability only emerged because of high demand, driven
by the information’s utility. The utility of peer information surfaced
in the well-established consumer-search theory developed in the
1970s by Phillip Nelson and others. This consumer search theory
dissected advertising into three categories of claims: search, experi-
ence, and credence.131 Peer information functions in the market as
highly-credible experience claims.
1. Information-Search Economics.
Search claims constitute the basic claims necessary for communi-
cating a product’s nature, availability, and price.132 Consumers can
verify “search” advertising claims, like category claims (“is this a ripe
tomato?”), relatively inexpensively—at the display or point of sale.
131. See Gary T. Ford et al., An Empirical Test of the Search, Experience and Credence Attributes
Framework, 15 ADVANCES IN CONSUMER RES. 239 (1988), http://www.acrwebsite.org/search/
view-conference-proceedings.aspx?Id=6817 [https://permacc/E2E6-FTX6] (“[I]n the past,
researchers have often referred to ‘goods’ or ‘attributes’ of goods as having either search,
experience or credence qualities. More appropriately, the focus must be on the advertising
claim, rather than the attribute of the product.”). I embrace the approach of Ford et al., and
others, on using search, experience, and credence to describe advertising claims rather than
attributes or categories of goods.
132. Nelson, supra note 32, at 312–14, 327 (distinguishing the search category of advertis-
ing claims from the experience category.)
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At the other end of the spectrum, credence advertising claims “de-
scribe advertiser communications that prove prohibitively costly or
conceptually impossible for the consumer to verify, even post-
purchase.”133 For example, a claim about the origin of manufac-
tured clothing or the integrity of a “free-range chicken” food label
would prove expensive for an individual consumer to investigate.
Credence advertising claims, by definition, require consumers to
put faith in (or appropriately discount) the claim with limited abil-
ity to verify the content.
Experience advertising claims occupy important ground in the in-
formation environment.134 For example, consider a fast-casual
restaurant’s advertising a claim that the restaurant’s salads taste
“fresh.”135 In an environment without other information, consum-
ers can individually test these sorts of claims, but only through
expending time and effort on testing and sampling. The sampling
typically takes place at the consumer’s own risk. If the salad fails to
meet freshness expectations, the consumer absorbs a negative expe-
rience, forgoing better consumption opportunities, and expending
resources in the process.
Consumers could verify that fresh salad claim in the pre-MRS era
most easily by investing time and money to buy a salad, fully absorb-
ing the cost of testing the claim to verify it, including the risk of
enduring the taste of a limp salad. The consumer could also invest
time to seek out the opinions of others who had tried the restau-
rant’s salad, but the costs of acquiring this information might
exceed the cost of sampling. After the experience, in the pre-MRS
era, the consumer might let others within an immediate social
sphere know about the disappointing transaction, but this informa-
tion dissemination would prove limited and impermanent, at least
compared with the record that the MRS would keep. Pre-MRS, the
consumer could complain to management and ask for a refund,
which would require social cost and time for a small item. The least-
costly reaction would be to retain the information and merely re-
fuse to repurchase that item or transact with that vendor.
133. David Adam Friedman, Refining Advertising Regulation, 49 CONN. L. REV. 837, 840
(2017) [hereinafter, Friedman, Refining]. Contemporaneously with Nelson’s work, Michael
R. Darby and Edi Karni identified the concept of credence qualities and credence “goods.”
See Michael R. Darby & Edi Karni, Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud, 16 J.L. &
ECON. 67, 68–72 (1973); id. at 843–52.
134. See generally, Friedman, Refining at 844–47, supra note 133 (Part II.B).
135. Nelson used canned tuna fish as his instrument for exploring “experience.” Nelson,
supra note 32, at 322. I have modernized the example to incorporate a dining transaction, a
transaction frequently reviewed on MRS platforms.
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In the current world, however, an MRS like Yelp or TripAdvisor
can present, in a curated manner, the shared experience of hordes
of peers who have already tested the claim by eating the salad. If the
masses adjudicate a restaurant’s salads as “fresh,” “not as fresh as
they say,” or “the freshest salad around,” shoppers can access and
internalize this experience information. They can do so at little to
no cost, conserving shopping time, and eliminating the expensive
sampling process. If MRS platforms accurately present ranges of ex-
periences and opinions, consumers can easily appropriate the
experience costs incurred by others, rendering the transactional
search process, and thus the market, more efficient, increasing con-
sumer welfare.
The value of aggregated and accessible peer information about
transactional experiences has become readily obvious to consum-
ers, making the development of MRS platforms attractive both in
standalone and supportive roles.136 MRS proprietors emerged to as-
semble and unlock the value of this information for consumers, as
well as to monetize it. Though the role of consumer experience
information in the shopping process remains conceptually un-
changed, the volume, breadth, and quality of “experiential”
information has elevated the importance of the category.
The economic role of experience information in the search pro-
cess explains, in part, why the lower cost of accessing such data has
led to increased usage and reliance—and why regulator efforts to
preserve the integrity and authenticity of the information could in-
crease welfare. If consumers expecting to encounter trusted
experience information are first confronted with AGC or are redi-
rected toward other choices in a misleading manner, the
information may not be put to use in the transaction in a manner
expected by the consumer.
However, the power of this information finds roots not just in
reducing consumer search costs but also in the tendency (recog-
nized elsewhere) for consumers to place higher value in the
opinion of peers. The MRS can use this charged information to
lure consumers to the platform—and peer reviews can serve as pow-
erful context for embedding AGC. The FTC acknowledged the
power of peer endorsements when promulgating guidelines about
consumer testimonials, and the reasoning behind that regulatory
initiative warrants revisiting.
136. Yelp alone hosts over 100 million unique visitors per month. See Yelp, Inc., Annual
Report at 44–45 (Form 10-K) (Feb. 27, 2015).
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2. Peer Endorsements.
MRS platforms offer to advertisers a backdrop of valuable peer
information for their commercial message. In two different con-
texts, the FTC advises the handling of peer information with special
care. Following this logic, the use of peer information as a back-
drop for commercial messages should also warrant special
regulatory attention, heightened over other suspect contexts.
In the Enforcement Policy Statement for Deceptive Formatting,
the Commission singled out for scrutiny, “paid endorsements of-
fered as the independent opinions of impartial consumers or
experts.”137 The presentation of paid endorsements masquerading
as impartial in origin, could, according to the FTC, confuse the
consumer about the context of the statement. In an adjacent arena,
the Commission found concern with advertisers’ showcase of truth-
ful, unpaid consumer testimonials and endorsements.138 These two
concerns about the power of peer information compound when
peer endorsements are used as context or as a lure for presentation
of AGC.
The presentation of advertising on MRS platforms stands
squarely at the intersection of these two areas at risk for potential
consumer deception. However, the FTC has not addressed formally
regulating this very zone where these two concerns overlap—the
presentation of consumer testimonials in the context of a mediated
platform, rather than within an advertiser’s own presentation.139
As noted, MRS data plays a role in driving a significant set of
consumer decisions. Taken alone, the peer-driven creation of the
data alone provides justification for heightened concern. Long
before the emergence of the modern MRS platform, sellers fa-
mously deployed “peer” or “consumer” endorsements in their
advertising to bolster efficacy of their narratives.140
137. FTC Enforcement Policy Statement on Deceptively Formatted Advertisements, 81
Fed. Reg. 22596, 22596 (Apr. 18, 2016).
138. See Guides Concerning the Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising, 16
C.F.R. § 255.0 (2016).
139. On the enforcement side, the FTC twice investigated the recommendation software
and business practices of Yelp, resulting in no action. Javier Panzar, Yelp Says FTC has Ended
2nd Inquiry into its Practices, Software, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2015, 2:34 PM), http://www.latimes
.com/business/la-fi-yelp-ftc-investigation-20150107-story.html.
140. See David Adam Friedman, Debiasing Advertising: Balancing Risk, Hope and Social Wel-
fare, 19 J.L. & POL’Y 539, 577–79 (2011) [hereinafter, Friedman, Debiasing.] (discussing the
successful, but now infamous, “Jared” advertising campaign for Subway).
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Formal studies commissioned by the FTC confirmed that peer
endorsements have an outsized effect on consumers, perhaps ex-
plaining their frequent appearance in advertising.141 Consumers
tend to embrace the positive outlier endorsements as representa-
tive, typical outcomes.142 Elsewhere, this Article has described the
classic cognitive biases that explain the powerful consumer reaction
to peer endorsements, warranting more scrutiny of the tactic.143
The optimism bias leads consumers to expect an exceptional peer
experience as their likely outcome.144 The peer experience may also
provide the most vivid and salient expected outcome for consum-
ers, tapping into the availability bias.145 Truthful but exceptional
peer experience narratives can establish reference points that en-
able unrealistic expectations, per the framing effect.146 Peer
endorsements also leverage the representativeness and confirmation bi-
ases, as consumers see random peer results as typical or view peer
results as consistent with previous perceptions or desired potential
outcomes, respectively.147 Peer endorsements and consumer testi-
monials prove highly effective as advertising tactics, in part for these
reasons.
Phillip Nelson’s suggestion that consumers would find the shared
experience of “friends” exceptionally credible rested in part on the
assumption that “the expected utility of a sample selected by a
141. A decade ago, the FTC commissioned two studies that demonstrated the strong in-
fluence peer endorsements (“testimonials”) have on consumers. MANOJ HASTAK & MICHAEL
B. MAZIS, EFFECTS OF CONSUMER TESTIMONIALS IN WEIGHT LOSS, DIETARY SUPPLEMENT AND
BUSINESS OPPORTUNITY ADVERTISEMENTS (2004), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/docu-
ments/reports/effects-consumer-testimonials-weight-loss-dietary-supplement-business-oppor
tunity-advertisements/report.pdf [hereinafter, HASTAK & MAZIS, CONSUMER TESTIMONIALS IN
WEIGHT LOSS]; MANOJ HASTAK & MICHAEL B. MAZIS, THE EFFECT OF CONSUMER TESTIMONIALS
AND DISCLOSURES ON AD COMMUNICATION FOR A DIETARY SUPPLEMENT (2003), https://www.ftc
.gov/system/files/documents/reports/effect-consumer-testimonials-disclosures-ad-commu-
nication-dietary-supplement-endorsement-booklet/030920consumerreport.pdf [hereinafter
HASTAK & MAZIS, CONSUMER TESTIMONIALS FOR A DIETARY SUPPLEMENT].
142. See Alex Wang, The Effects of Expert and Consumer Endorsements on Audience Response, 45
J. ADVERT. RES. 402 (2005) (concluding that positive consumer endorsements improve con-
sumer attitudes about the endorsed offering. see also Ahmed E. Taha, Selling the Outlier, 41 J.
Corp. L. 459 (2015) (describing the power of peer endorsements and the problem with out-
lier experiences.). See generally HASTAK & MAZIS, CONSUMER TESTIMONIALS IN WEIGHT LOSS,
supra note 141, Hastak & Mazis, Consumer Testimonials for A Dietary Supplement, supra
note 141.
143. See Friedman, Debiasing, supra note 140, at 585–97 (describing the various cognitive
biases and effects triggered by peer opinions).
144. See id. at 585–90.
145. See id. at 590–91.
146. See id. at 591–94.
147. See id. at 594–97.
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friend will be greater than the expected utility of a random sam-
ple.”148 He observed, writing amidst the technology of 1970, that
friend-guided sampling would not prove endlessly renewable as a
resource. In sum, friendship has privileges, but also boundaries.
“Friends are more than happy to advise occasionally,” Nelson ob-
served.149 “[M]ost would find continual guidance about all the
details of purchasing somewhat unpleasant.”150
Today, however, “social-media” friends, albeit not personal
friends, have flooded the information marketplace, eager to volun-
teer details of purchasing everything from hockey sticks to movie
tickets to restaurant meals—making their opinions perpetually and
sometimes permanently available. Though Nelson’s observations
still hold, technology and social media have redefined friendship,
expanding willingness to share experiences, and lowering the cost
of accessing them. Nelson noted that social norms naturally lead
people to limit their conversations with friends about consumer ex-
periences and that accordingly consumers “try to use [a] limited
amount of [friend] guidance to where it will do . . . the most
good.”151
Nelson contends that using a “guide” like a friend for sampling
has social costs, and consumers have a choice about whether and
when to use “guided sampling.”152 “Where unguided sampling is
cheap, guided sampling will not be used.”153 MRS platforms have
made “guided sampling” cheaper, if not free, and more readily ac-
cessible, enabling the consumer to tap into a larger, information-
rich pool of high-utility information, albeit of varying quality.
Finally grappling with the power of traditional peer information,
in 2011 the FTC formally promulgated the Guides Concerning the
Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising.154 The FTC
cautioned advertisers against inducing unrealistic consumer expec-
tations through the peer endorsement or “testimonial”
technique.155 Perhaps reflecting the aforementioned behavioral
bias concerns, the FTC warned advertisers that these endorsements
should leave an impression of an experience representative of
“what consumers will generally achieve” through product use.156
148. Nelson, supra note 32, at 321.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Guides Concerning the Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising, 16
C.F.R. § 255.0–55.5 (2016).
155. See id.
156. See Consumer Endorsements, 16 C.F.R § 255.2(b) (2016).
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In short, peer-created, consumer-testimonial data draws consum-
ers to MRS platforms for a variety of reasons. First, the use of peer
information proves attractive and influential, and has long pre-
dated the technology and ubiquity of the modern MRS. Second,
peer information, especially when inexpensive to access, proves val-
uable to consumers seeking relevant and timely (if not instant) data
to guide transactional decisions.
MRS platforms harness the power of these peer endorsements to
attract users expecting a display of unbiased, authentic opinions.
The sale of advertising or the ability to manipulate the MRS presen-
tation seriously undermines these expectations. Preserving the
integrity of this data through higher scrutiny should rise as a regula-
tory priority, particularly when MRS platforms and advertisers
collaborate to use these platforms to promote a persuasive commer-
cial message. This commercial message, as noted above, often
emerges at the very moment when consumers seek to transact.157
B. The Power of Advertising Context
Having established that peer endorsements have a powerful
draw, the context within which the MRS platform places the paid
advertising warrants analysis. As noted, in 2015 the FTC promul-
gated the Enforcement Policy Statement on Deceptively Formatted
Advertisements—enforcement policy mostly focused on disclosure
requirements. These policies and associated guidance associated
with “native advertising” reflect reactions to the tensions inherent
in offering commercial content embedded in apparently neutral
formats to lure consumer attention.158
The terms “sponsored content” and “advertorials” have often
been used synonymously with native advertising.159 As one advertis-
ing industry insider observed, defining native advertising with
concreteness proves challenging. “Native advertising can’t just be
157. See supra Part I.A. Eighty percent of Yelp users “visit Yelp because they intend to
make a purchase . . . .” By the Numbers: 52 Amazing Yelp Statistics, DMR, http://expandedramb
lings.com/index.php/yelp-statistics/3/ [https://web.archive.org/web/20171018040357/
https://expandedramblings.com/index.php/yelp-statistics/3/#.WebSxGhSzIU] (last up-
dated Oct. 6, 2017).
158. FTC Enforcement Policy Statement on Deceptively Formatted Advertisements, 81
Fed. Reg. 22596 (Apr. 18, 2016); see Native Advertising, supra note 7.
159. See Erin Griffith, Sponsored Content is the Holy Grail of Digital Publishing. But Does it
Work?, FORTUNE (July 9, 2014), http://fortune.com/2014/07/09/readers-dislike-sponsored-
content-native-ads/. An advertorial is “[a] newspaper or magazine advertisement giving infor-
mation about a product in the style of an editorial or objective journalistic article.”
Advertorial, OXFORD ENG. LIVING DICTIONARY, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/
advertorial.
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about the creative that fills an advertising space. Native advertising
must be intrinsically connected to the format that fits the user’s
unique experience.”160 Nonetheless, in guidance, the FTC arrived
at the following definition: “content that bears a similarity to the
news, feature articles, product reviews, entertainment, and other
material that surrounds it online.”161
The FTC expressed a primary concern about consumer welfare
with respect to deceptive native advertising practices:
In determining whether an advertisement, including its for-
mat, misleads consumers, the Commission considers the
overall “net impression” it conveys . . . . [A]dvertising and pro-
motional messages that are not identifiable as advertising to
consumers are deceptive if they mislead consumers into believ-
ing they are independent, impartial, or not from the
sponsoring advertiser itself. Knowing the source of an advertise-
ment or promotional message typically affects the weight or credibility
consumers give it. Such knowledge also may influence whether
and to what extent consumers choose to interact with content
containing a promotional message.162
Beyond this basic concern about the disproportionate “weight”
and “credibility” of native advertising, the FTC also voiced specific
concerns about digital media.163 Advertisers have used native adver-
tising in some form for nearly a century.164 In 1917, the FTC’s
earliest infancy, the Commission ordered a vacuum cleaner seller to
cease and desist from falsely presenting the context of its brash ad-
vertisement claims in a seemingly neutral format.165 Though this
advertising practice has established routes, today’s platforms deliver
the advertising right to devices, just at the point where consumers
are ready to transact.
Today, MRS technology brings efficiency to the shopping pro-
cess, as explored in the discussion of experience claims, but at the
160. Mitch Joel, We Need a Better Definition of “Native Advertising,” HARVARD BUS. REV. (Feb.
23, 2013), https://hbr.org/2013/02/we-need-a-better-definition-of.
161. Native Advertising, supra note 7.
162. See FTC Enforcement Policy Statement on Deceptively Formatted Advertisements, 81
Fed. Reg. 22596, 22596 (Apr. 18, 2016). (emphasis added).
163. Id.
164. See generally Lesley Fair, Remarks, A Historical FTC Perspective: Advertorials, Infomercials,
and Paid Endorsement, in FTC, Blurred Lines: Advertising or Content? An FTC Workshop on
Native Advertising 11, 11–24 (2013), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/pub-
lic_events/171321/final_transcript_1.pdf.
165. See FTC v. Muenzen Specialty Co., 1 F.T.C. 30 (1917).
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same time, amplifies the fundamental problems with native adver-
tising. The FTC observes that the internet environment facilitates
and has increased dissemination of commercial messages “indistin-
guishable from news, feature articles, product reviews, editorial,
entertainment, and other regular content.”166 In contrast to tradi-
tional media “a [digital] publisher . . . can easily and inexpensively
format an ad so it matches the style and layout of the content into
which it is integrated in ways not previously available . . . . The effect
is to mask the signals consumers customarily have relied upon to recognize
an advertising or promotional message.”167
Additionally, native advertising associates with the tactic of the
“misleading door opener.” The misleading-door opener describes
when advertisers use a non-commercial pretext to lure the con-
sumer to view a commercial offering.168 These door openers can
disrupt the consumer search process, leading them toward making
a transaction that they might not have pursued if left to search for a
transaction without the disruption. If a consumer believes that a
platform is authentic, but the platform opens the door to paid of-
ferings, the “door opened” based on trickery. Such “misleading
doors” might, at quick glance, appear as news articles or appear in a
manner that makes the consumer believe that the authority of the
context seem authentic, like an MRS platform.169
Without the misleading door opener, the consumer may con-
tinue to search in an ordinary, uninterrupted course, and may find
a more welfare-enhancing deal. In the context of the MRS, a user
may use the MRS to seek the best nearby delicatessens but, upon
commencing search, may first confront a promoted, paid-for adver-
tisement that leapfrogs a search for the “best.” If the commercial
nature of the AGC is disclosed, the letter of meeting the require-
ments of the Enforcement Policy Statement have been satisfied.
The question is whether this base-level of disclosure suffices in cir-
cumstances where the context for the advertisement carries much
more credibility, as it does with peer endorsements.
In sum, the FTC’s concerns about native advertising should apply
to concerns about advertising in all formats but especially the MRS
platform. The MRS platform can easily cloak the bias of a spon-
sored commercial message in its well-promoted and powerful
166. FTC Enforcement Policy Statement on Deceptively Formatted Advertisements, 81
Fed. Reg. 22596, 22596 (Apr. 18, 2016).
167. Id. (emphasis added).
168. FTC Enforcement Policy Statement, , 81 Fed. Reg. at 22598.
169. For a news website illustration, see Native Advertising, supra note 7, at ex. 7.
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authenticity. The FTC’s concerns about the ability of online tech-
nology to exacerbate an old problem apply to this newer, cutting-
edge manner of relaying transactional information.
In the MRS environment, the power of the peer endorsement
meets the power of native advertising, creating a ripe opportunity
for consumer confusion in the transactional process. Peer endorse-
ments create integrity and authority expectations greater than that
of a news website, extrapolating from the FTC’s chosen area of con-
cerns. People accord great weight to the opinions of friends, family,
and neighbors. Although the aggregation of these opinions may
not be as powerful as the real thing, the lower cost of the data ren-
ders it quite attractive to use.
Drawn to this platform, consumers expect an authentic presenta-
tion of information—and if the whole of this presentation yields an
inauthentic effort to persuade or redirect, consumers may make de-
cisions not in accord with their intent upon using the platform. The
FTC has identified that advertising context can mask the signals
that consumers typically seek in making transactional decisions or
lead them to “open doors,”170 disrupting their transactional search
process, under manipulative pretexts.171
Without doubt, consumers benefit from the collection, aggrega-
tion, presentation, and ready access to MRS data. The impact on
consumers from MRS cognitive and contextual manipulation on
compromised MRS platforms, however, may distort transactions
without consumers having awareness of their own manipulation.
For example, after being drawn to a neutral MRS platform and led
to an advertisement for a restaurant during a geography-based
search, the consumer may never look further because of time con-
straints. Though the consumer may express satisfaction with the
transaction, a superior transaction may have been forgone. As
Judge Easterbrook put it colloquially, “One important reason for
requiring truth is so that competition in the market will lead to
appropriate prices. Selling brass as gold harms consumers indepen-
dent of any effect on pain.”172 The consumer may not feel the pain
of the forgone transaction, but the market disruption is real.
170. See FTC Enforcement Policy Statement on Deceptively Formatted Advertisements, 81
Fed. Reg. 22596, 22598–99 (Apr. 18, 2016) (describing misleading door openers).
171. See David Adam Friedman, Reconsidering Fictitious Pricing, 100 MINN. L. REV. 921,
960–63 (2016) [hereinafter, Friedman, Fictitious Pricing] (analyzing the negative welfare im-
pact of another “misleading door opener,” deceptive discount pricing).
172. FTC v. QT, Inc., 512 F.3d 858, 863 (7th Cir. 2008).
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More formally, as Howard Beales et al. observed, information
failures lead to resource misallocation and welfare reduction.173
Consumers relying on compromised MRS data may make transac-
tions based on poor information about information.174
The importance of information to the operation of efficient
markets is, by now, fairly well accepted. Information about
price, quality, and other attributes allows buyers to make the
best use of their budget by finding the product whose mix of
price and quality they most prefer . . . . Without such informa-
tion, the incentive to compete on price and quality will be
weakened, and consumer welfare will be reduced.175
Further, as these sources become more important as a primary
source of information in some markets (for example, the market
for speedy retention of a criminal lawyer), the social importance of
integrity escalates. Without doubt, the pre-advertising—and pre-in-
ternet—market for lawyers left consumers with fewer resources,
and services like Avvo have been “game changers.” Due to their
unique intermediary nature, however, MRS platforms like Avvo
have an extra duty to provide the public with authentic informa-
tion. Choosing a lawyer might be socially more important than
selecting a taco stand. Regulators stand positioned to mitigate the
risk of suboptimal transactions in this zone.
As illustrated in Part III, market forces play a role in ensuring
that the presentation of MRS data retains authenticity, but regula-
tors may find themselves situated to supplement market forces to
enhance welfare.
III. POTENTIAL PRIVATE SOLUTIONS
As Eric Goldman appropriately warned, “any regulation of
reputational information needs to be carefully considered to en-
sure it is improving, not harming, marketplace mechanisms.”176
Regulating information can lead to a variety of ambiguous or unfa-
vorable welfare outcomes, including reducing the overall amount
173. See Howard Beales et al., The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information, 24 J.L. &
ECON. 491, 492 (1981).
174. See generally Goldman, supra note 1 at 295 (discussing information failures and wel-
fare loss specifically in the context of MRS).
175. Beales et al., supra note 173 at 492.
176. Goldman, supra note 1 at 296.
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of information available in the market.177 Beales and his coauthors
observed that “remedying deficiencies in the information market is
in some ways a more complex and subtle task than regulating prod-
uct markets directly.”178 Therefore, exploring the potential for
market solutions to an information problem should be a prerequi-
site to any regulatory prescription.
Markets may sort out most of the challenges involved in preserv-
ing the integrity of MRS platforms. If a platform appears biased,
overly commercial, or “inauthentic,” as discussed in Part III.A.,
users will stop engaging with the platform. Competition for users
inspires platforms to compete on grounds of utility and credibility,
and to develop self-regulatory mechanisms. Commercial players are
also incentivized to keep each other honest, as explored in Part
III.B. Also discussed is the role of private litigation in generating
more authentic information, essentially as an externality. A scan of
the few recent written opinions involving MRS platforms (reported
and unreported) reveals that private litigation over issues of infor-
mation integrity advances authenticity enough to obviate some
need for public regulation. This litigation, however, does not help
solve the problems inherent in the embedding of AGC amidst the
powerful context of aggregated peer reviews.
A. Market Solutions
Standalone MRS enterprises compete vigorously for users. An ac-
tive user community is the most basic requirement for drawing
advertisers. A standalone platform requires a beehive of users regu-
larly visiting the platform and contributing fresh content. To
maintain viability, the MRS must acquire, retain, and engage users
in the market—and compete with other advertising platforms to
deliver a sufficient return on investment. Authenticity of the con-
tent presentation presents a primary dimension for competition for
users.
177. For example, reducing the flow of information might interfere with the welfare-gen-
erating forces of price competition. One analysis revealed that “the prices of goods and
services in places that restrict advertising tend to be higher than those in places that do not
restrict advertising.” Zeynep K. Hansen & Marc T. Law, The Political Economy of Truth-in-Adver-
tising Regulation During the Progressive Era, 51 J.L. & ECON. 251, 255 (2008). Over time,
industry-focused studies have revealed that deregulation of price disclosure reduces prices.
See Friedman, Reconsidering Fictitious Pricing, supra note 171, at 958–59.
178. Beales et al., supra note 173, at 514.
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1. Competition for Users.
Social media platforms, including MRS entities, compete aggres-
sively for users; as such, competitors rise and fall quickly. Though
not an MRS, a notorious example of competition in this dimension
involved the rise and fall of Myspace, and the subsequent social-
media domination by Facebook.179 Former Facebook president
Sean Parker attributed Myspace’s troubles to a “junk heap of bad
design,”180 and perhaps more notably, to a failure to create a plat-
form where users shared their authentic selves.181 Parker’s thesis
was that users quickly flocked from Myspace to Facebook for these
reasons, among others.182
With respect to MRS platforms, similar dynamics apply. The dy-
namics reveal themselves in broad form through an examination of
the experience of some of the leading players.183 Factors such as
design and authenticity can take users away from competitors. Fol-
lowing Parker’s perspective, within the MRS space, if design
becomes overly cluttered, if the service generates an inauthentic ex-
perience or barriers to desired user interaction, users will be more
likely to abandon the service.
Angie’s List presents a compelling example of the importance of
competition for users, given recent changes to their structure made
in response to market dynamics. In 2016, after financial struggles
and pressures from investors, Angie’s List announced plans to re-
move their paywall to give broader access to reviews, focusing on
179. See Amy Lee, Myspace Collapse: How The Social Network Fell Apart, HUFFINGTON POST
(Aug. 30, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/06/30/how-myspace-fell-
apart_n_887853.html. In early 2008, “Myspace was top dog.” Id. By April 2008 “. . . upstart
Facebook grabbed the lead . . . In [the subsequent] three years, Myspace . . . lost over forty
million unique visitors per month, lost both co-founders, . . . [and] diminished to a cluttered
afterthought of the power it once was.” Id.
180. Alexia Tsotsis, Sean Parker on Why Myspace Lost to Facebook, TECHCRUNCH (June 28,
2011), https://techcrunch.com/2011/06/28/sean-parker-on-why-myspace-lost-to-facebook/.
Parker noted Myspace’s “failure to execute product development . . . . They weren’t success-
ful in treating and evolving the product enough . . . . There was a period of time where if they
had just copied Facebook rapidly, they would have been Facebook.” Id.
181. Amy Lee, Facebook Ex-President Sean Parker: I Trolled for Girls on Myspace, HUFFINGTON
POST (Aug. 22, 2011), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/06/22/sean-parker-nextwork-
myspace_n_882183.html. Parker recalled that with Myspace “[t]here was no verifiable, ac-
countable, persistent identity that could follow you from place to place, that you maintained
and curated in an accurate way. . . . Until you establish that identity layer for the Internet a
lot of things aren’t possible. Myspace wasn’t providing that.” Id.
182. See id. A cautionary note on surveys and language, “authenticity” may carry different
meanings to different groups. As such “authenticity” may prove to be a buzzword for millen-
nials one year but not the next. See Barton et. al, supra note 45 at ex. 5 (noting that
“authentic” was a buzzword for millennials in 2012 but not in 2013).
183. Though I do not offer a complete industry survey, I discuss representative MRS enti-
ties to illustrate the competitive dynamics.
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generating revenue from advertising from reviewed businesses.184
This change represented a fundamental departure from a focus on
a consumer subscription-based model185 to a user engagement
model more like Yelp’s. The changing user demographics186 that
have been highlighting the centrality of MRS platforms have also
forced this established player to choose a different strategy. CEO
Scott Durchslag explained that “the reviews paywall served the com-
pany well for the last twenty years, but looking ahead to the next
twenty years — millennials are not going to pay for reviews.”187 100
million people were visiting the site but ninety percent “were
bouncing off the paywall.”188
Though Angie’s List has sourced revenue from advertisers in the
past, if the company follows this new strategy, it will become sub-
stantially more dependent on advertising revenue.189 Competition
has compelled Angie’s List to migrate from serving users by sub-
scription to facing the tension of serving paid advertisers while
maintaining authenticity. As Angie’s List discloses to investors, “Our
business depends on the strength of our brand, which is built on a
foundation of authentic reviews and [consumer] trust . . . failure to
maintain that authenticity and trust would damage our brand and
harm our ability to maintain or expand our membership and ser-
vice provider bases.”190
Angie’s List has recognized that the MRS model that yields the
most tension between users and advertisers also offers the most
promising path to maximizing shareholder value. The company al-
most perfectly echoes Sean Parker’s warnings about “authentic”
experiences made in the context of the collapse of Myspace. Com-
petition pushed Angie’s List, an MRS pioneer, toward this newer
model. Consumers want to access information freely yet engage au-
thentically—and Angie’s List’s struggles with its prior model reflect
that challenge.
Competition for users may drive standalone MRS industry players
toward this higher-tension, AGC-funded model, as embodied by
Yelp. Angie’s List’s flight from a paid subscription service toward
184. Kris Turner, Angie’s List to Drop Reviews’ Paywall in Effort to Generate Revenue, INDIANAP-
OLIS STAR (Mar. 3, 2016, 8:16 PM), http://www.indystar.com/story/money/2016/03/03/
angies-list-drop-review-paywall-effort-generate-revenue/81212140/.
185. See Brett Molina, Angie’s List to Replace Subscription Model with Tiered Plans, USA TODAY
(Mar. 3, 2016, 1:41 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2016/03/03/angies-
list-replace-subscription-model-tiered-plans/81251508/.
186. See supra Part I.A.
187. Molina, supra note 185.
188. Turner, supra note 184.
189. See Angie’s List, Inc., Annual Report, supra note 91, at 3–4.
190. Id. at 10 (emphasis added).
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this model suggests that users value free and open access to infor-
mation, while discounting—or simply not noticing—the influence
of advertisers amidst peer reviews. Regardless of the competitive
forces driving the dynamic, striving for platform authenticity in an
AGC-funded model may not yield actual authenticity, as success in
this market for users only requires the mere appearance of
authenticity.
Zagat, a pioneer and established brand in gathering and distrib-
uting restaurant reviews in hard copy form,191 struggled with efforts
to make the transition from a unique, successful book-based aggre-
gator of information to competing with online review platforms.192
Yelp, competing for a subset of Zagat users, enjoyed a superior en-
gagement interface “by making its contributors the stars of its site,”
enabling them to achieve “elite status” and receive special invita-
tions to events.193 Zagat had to manage online cannibalization of
the book that epitomized its brand, as well as the challenges
presented by paywalls, including Google’s disfavor of paywall sites
in search results.194 By a large magnitude, the open Yelp reviews
became more accessible to users on the dominant search engine.195
Ultimately, Zagat’s ownership sold the company to Google for
$151 million, effectively liberating their valuable data.196 Following
the lead of one component of the tension model, user engagement
became the priority for Google with respect to Zagat. As Google’s
Head of Zagat put it, “It’s not about paying for information or cre-
ating registration barriers. We want to surface this content. It comes
down to focusing on the user and what makes a good experi-
ence . . . .”197 The integration with Google Maps also became a
synergistic addition to a more engaged platform.198 Moving to the
model of freely-accessed and engaged reviews reflects the trend that
191. See Our History, ZAGAT, https://www.zagat.com/about-us/our-history (last visited Oct.
17, 2017).
192. See, e.g., Ron Lieber, Zagat Survey Aims to Regain its Online Balance, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
13, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/14/technology/14zagat.html?mcubz=0.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. See id.
196. Barth, supra note 41.
197. Paolo Lucchesi, Google Unveils New Zagat Integration, Including Free Access to Zagat Res-
taurant Ratings, INSIDE SCOOP S.F, (July 29, 2013, 10:12 AM), http://insidescoopsf.sfgate
.com/blog/2013/07/29/google-unveils-new-zagat-integration-including-free-access-to-zagat-
restaurant-ratings/. Google’s integration execution faced criticism. See generally Sam Grobart,
How Google Has Completely Botched Zagat, BLOOMBERG NEWS (July 31, 2013, 8:41 PM), https://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-07-31/how-google-has-completely-botched-zagat.
198. See Lucchesi, supra note 197.
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drove Angie’s List to move away from a subscription-heavy ap-
proach, further emphasizing that the market may move in this
direction.
In terms of a market-based solution, the market appears to pull
in the direction of free and open access to users, requiring the
standalone MRS to rely on contextual advertising, but not necessa-
rily requiring the same of the supportive MRS. For example, the
MRS platforms of Google and Facebook may prove less likely to
have a conflict with advertisers because of the substantive breadth
of their search-engine and social media-based platforms.
Both Google and Facebook seek to engage and retain users by all
means possible to lure eyeballs in for a broad array of advertising,
not just advertising displayed for the narrow purpose related to the
search. In other words, because Google and Facebook are not solely
MRS-driven advertising businesses, the potential conflict dilutes.
Nonetheless, some tension still inheres, and if the MRS market con-
centrates through mergers, acquisitions, and scale-driven growth,
the commercialization of MRS platforms within these larger entities
warrants scrutiny on these dimensions.
Ultimately, competition for users restricts the degree to which
open MRS platforms can deploy persuasive advertising. Competi-
tion appears to have led toward free and open access. If a platform
undermines its own authenticity in a visible way, an alternative in-
formation source will presumably emerge to displace it.
Nonetheless, if viable entities similarly land on a strategy that
presents information in a manner that deceives consumers un-
detectably while being injurious to their welfare, competition for
users will have failed to address the problem of contextual
advertising.
2. Self-Policing Authenticity.
MRS platforms have an incentive to prevent gaming of their plat-
forms though businesses cheating the system to generate false
positive reviews. Permitting false positive reviews to stand could un-
dermine user confidence in the system and could ultimately create
a rush to create false positive reviews—and false negative reviews of
competitors. By 2011, a cottage industry and effort had emerged to
generate positive reviews for businesses.199 MRS platforms can ill-
199. See, e.g., David Streitfeld, In a Race to Out-Rave, 5-Star Web Reviews Go for $5, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 19, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/20/technology/finding-fake-reviews-on-
line.html?mcubz=0.
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afford to devalue the apparent integrity of their platform, lest they
lose users and experience declined engagement, so they re-
sponded. Not to mention, the parasitic profiteering off of the
platform’s trust likely derailed the more legitimate (though still po-
tentially troubling) path—paying for direct advertising on the
platform.
As such, Yelp has launched “sting operation[s]” to ensure that
reviews have integrity.200 In 2012, Yelp ensnared eight businesses
after a Yelp employee posing as an “elite reviewer” solicited pay-
ments in exchange for a positive review.201 The offered payments in
the sting ranged from $5–$30.202 Yelp kept the punishments inter-
nal to the site. For three months, Yelp posted a “consumer alert” on
the offending business pages, featuring the sting’s e-mail exchanges
and a note that declared, “We caught someone red-handed trying
to buy reviews for this business.”203 Yelp continues to aggressively
pursue those who generate false reviews,204 right along with
Facebook,205 Twitter,206 and Amazon.207
In 2014, Yelp was subject to an extensive investigation about ma-
nipulation of reviews. Prompted by business complaints, the FTC
investigated and cleared Yelp of promoting certain reviews over
others, based on whether a reviewed business advertised, and
whether the site “manipulated reviews” based on “ad buy.”208 Fur-
ther bolstering the FTC’s findings, a 2016 Management Science study
200. See David Streitfeld, Buy Reviews on Yelp, Get Black Mark, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/18/technology/yelp-tries-to-halt-deceptive-reviews
.html?mcubz=0; see also Friedman, Addressing Commercialization, supra note 4 at 83.
201. Streitfeld, Buy Reviews on Yelp, Get Black Mark, supra note 200.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. See, e.g., Luther Lowe, How Yelp Protects Consumers from False Reviews, HUFFINGTON
POST (July 15, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/luther-lowe/how-yelp-protects-con-
sume_b_3275848.html (editorial written by Yelp’s public affairs director discussing sting
operations and review filtering). See generally Kashmir Hill, I Created a Fake Business and Bought
it an Amazing Online Reputation, SPLINTER NEWS (Sept. 15, 2015, 7:00 AM), http://splin-
ternews.com/i-created-a-fake-business-and-bought-it-an-amazing-onli-1793850918 (testing the
seeming quixotic efforts of Yelp, Facebook, Twitter, and Amazon).
205. See Facebook Pages: Keeping Activity Authentic, FACEBOOK BUS., https://www.facebook
.com/business/a/page/fake-likes [https://web.archive.org/web/20171018050125/https://
www.facebook.com/business/a/page/fake-likes] (last visited Oct. 17, 2017) (expressing
Facebook’s deep concerns about “fake ‘likes’ ” of businesses).
206. See Fake Engagements on Twitter, TWITTER HELP CTR., https://support.twitter.com/arti-
cles/20171870 [https://web.archive.org/web/20171018050237/https://support.twitter
.com/articles/20171870](last visited Oct. 17, 2017).
207. See Imysantiago, Amazon a Virtual Marketplace or Big Brother?, IMYSANTIAGO.COM (July 2,
2015), https://imysantiago.com/2015/07/02/amazon-a-virtual-marketplace-or-big-brother/.
208. See Rolfe Winkler, Yelp Says FTC Won’t Act on Complaints About Its Reviews, WALL ST. J.:
DIGITS BLOG (Jan. 6, 2015, 4:27 PM), https://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2015/01/06/yelp-says-ftc-
wont-act-on-complaints-about-its-reviews/.
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recognizing that the “credibility of [ ] reviews is fundamentally un-
dermined when businesses commit review fraud . . . .” confirmed
that Yelp’s algorithm appears largely effective at filtering out fake
reviews.209 Yelp, unsurprisingly, welcomed these results, citing the
finding that “Yelp’s current implementation of the filtering al-
gorithm [did] not treat advertisers’ reviews in a manner different to
non-advertisers’ reviews”210 as the “debunking” of a “conspiracy
theory.”211
The FTC’s review, and this independent study, affirm that Yelp’s
efforts to prevent users and reviewed businesses from tampering
with the authenticity of the platform have been effective. These in-
ternal filtering systems, however, do not address the potential
confusion resulting from AGC presented in the context of peer re-
views. The market is protected from fraudulent review
manipulation, but the potential confusion from the presentation of
AGC alongside peer reviews presents an entirely different problem.
Likewise, Angie’s List declares internal rules, raising and answer-
ing the question: “How Does Angie’s List Make Money?” for those
who make the effort to seek out the methods under their website’s
“frequently-asked-questions” tab.212 In addition to membership fees,
Angie’s List tells the public that the company:
[G]enerates revenue from service providers. For example,
Angie’s List allows providers who have earned an “A”- and “B”-
overall rating and meet other eligibility requirements to pay to
advertise coupons, discounts, or other promotions to . . . mem-
bers through [their] website, magazine, and call center. If a
provider’s rating falls below a “B” or if they fail to respond to
our Complaint Resolution team, [Angie’s List] will revoke
their advertising privileges and remove their coupons, dis-
counts, and promotions from the magazine, our call center,
and AngiesList.com.213
209. Michael Luca & Georgios Zervas, Fake it Till You Make It: Reputation, Competition, and
Yelp Review Fraud, 62 MGMT. SCI. 3412, 3412 (2016).
210. Michael Luca & Georgios Zervas, Fake It Till You Make It: Reputation, Competition,
and Yelp Review Fraud 12 (Nov. 8, 2013) (unpublished version of the article) (on file with
Yelp, Inc.), https://www.yelpblog.com/2013/12/harvard-study-debunks-yelp-extortion-con-
spiracy-theory-yelp-doesnt-extort ; see Luca & Zervas, supra note 209, at 3417–18 (using similar
language in the final version of the article).
211. Luther Lowe, Yelp, Inc., HBS Study Debunks “Extortion” Conspiracy Theory, YELP BLOG
(Dec. 10, 2013), https://www.yelpblog.com/2013/12/harvard-study-debunks-yelp-extortion-
conspiracy-theory-yelp-doesnt-extort.
212. How Does Angie’s List Make Money?, ANGIE’S LIST (Feb. 9, 2017), https://www.angieslist
.com/faq/how-does-angie-s-list-make-money/.
213. Id.
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As Angie’s List transitions from a subscription model to an advertis-
ing model,214 these internal integrity rules may become more
important mechanisms to preserve integrity.
Yet questions still remain about the effectiveness of these internal
initiatives to discourage and eliminate false reviews. Journalist Kash-
mir Hill recently reported about her experiment that demonstrated
how easily and inexpensively she could establish a fictional business
with “purchased” buzz.215 For her made-up business, the mobile
“Freakin’ Awesome Karaoke Express” (a/k/a “FAKE”), Hill paid
people to generate Twitter followers, Facebook likes, and to write
Yelp and Facebook reviews.216 The efforts to generate buzz with fake
information appeared to work, as Hill reported receiving phone in-
quiries about hiring out the “Express.”217
This baseline integrity problem appears to draw enough atten-
tion from the platforms that further regulation might not be
necessary—and the incentives of the platforms are somewhat al-
igned with deterring false information.
Some regulation has aimed to preserve information integrity.
The FTC has, for example, declared unlawful the presentation of
undisclosed paid reviews by bloggers and other peers218 because
consumers might not otherwise factor in the editorial bias. On a
different dimension, Congress passed the Consumer Review Fair-
ness Act of 2016 to prevent businesses from inducing consumers to
contract away their rights to write reviews.219 This new law banned
the practice of insertion of “anti-review clauses” into consumer
agreements,220 protecting the “credibility and value of online
214. See supra Part I.B.1.b.i.
215. See Hill, supra note 204.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. See, e.g., Guides on Use of Consumer Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising,
16 C.F.R. § 255.0 (2016).
219. Consumer Review Fairness Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114–258, 130 Stat 1355 (15
U.S.C. §§ 45b, 58); Eric Goldman, Understanding the Consumer Review Fairness Act of 2016,
MICH. TELECOM. & TECH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 1–2), https://ssrn
.com/abstract=2922242.
220. Id. (manuscript at 1) (presenting a thorough background and analysis of the new
law). Eric Goldman uses this term to encompass “gag clauses,” “non-disparagement clauses,”
and also restrictions on reviews that are not disparaging. Id. (manuscript at 1 n.2). Goldman
has also been a significant influencer of this legislation. See, e.g., Zero Stars: How Gagging Hon-
est Reviews Harms Consumers and the Economy: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and
Transp., 114th Cong. 18–35 (2015) (statement of Eric Goldman, Professor, Santa Clara Uni-
versity); Eric Goldman, You Shouldn’t Need a Lawyer to Pick a Dentist, FORBES (Apr. 17, 2013,
1:14 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2013/04/17/you-shouldnt-need-a-
copyright-lawyer-to-pick-a-dentist/#161d8269691c.
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consumer reviews [through prohibition of] clauses restricting nega-
tive, yet truthful” reviews.221
The paid-review disclosure helps consumers separate genuine
peer reviews from advertising. The Consumer Review Fairness Act
ensures the flow and caliber of genuine consumer reviews. These
interventions preserve the flow and caliber of peer information.
Nonetheless, the specific problem of contextual advertising on
MRS platforms has gone largely unnoticed by lawmakers and
regulators.
Private actors, discussed next, have made civil claims alleging in-
tegrity issues (i.e., falsehoods) with MRS data, but these actions will
not yield integrity with respect to the inherent tension between
serving users and advertisers on a platform full of peer reviews.
B. The Role of Private Civil Actions
Since 2012, MRS platforms have been party to several different
archetypes of litigation. Although an examination of all of these
cases would prove impractical, a sampling proves instructive. A
Westlaw search for litigation involving Yelp, Angie’s List, and Avvo
from 2012 to 2017 reveals that litigation has been sparse but consis-
tent.222 Of course, this search excludes cases that involve MRS
platforms as non-parties. Yelp reports receiving a steady flow of re-
quests and demands for reviewer identities, indicating that
businesses are attempting to address the content of reviews through
legal processes—and perhaps otherwise.223 Nonetheless, approxi-
mately seventeen distinct cases related to content emerged from
221. H.R. REP. NO. 114–731 at 7 (2016); see also Goldman, Understanding the Consumer
Review Fairness Act of 2016, supra note 219 (manuscript at 2) (explaining the goals of the
statute).
222. David Adam Friedman, Case Count (Feb. 19, 2017) (unpublished Microsoft Excel
file) (on file with author). These three entities were chosen because assessing the litigation of
standalone players proves much more practical to distill. I searched for the names of these
three entities in case captions during this period. Because I searched for litigation content,
not holdings, I included unreported cases. See id. This search could be broader, and would
reveal more instances of lawsuits over content posted on MRS platforms, not naming MRS
platforms as a party. Eric Goldman summarized the nature of lawsuits brought by physicians
against patients and patients’ relatives over reviews posted on line. See Eric Goldman, Patients’
Online Reviews of Physicians, 2013 LAHEY HEALTH J. OF MED. ETHICS 6.
223. Angus Loten, Yelp Regularly Gets Subpoenas About Users, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 2, 2014, 4:23
PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/yelp-regularly-receives-subpoenas-about-users-13964675
36.
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this search method during this timeframe, including pro se mat-
ters.224 Though this search does not purport to exhaust the array of
legal activity involving MRS platforms, the results prove instructive.
The most typical cases involve simple, but unsuccessful, attempts
by businesses or their owners to sue the MRS platforms for publish-
ing or relaying disparaging reviews.225 Defamation or related causes
of action formed the basis of these complaints, which were largely
dismissed because of the immunity afforded by Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act (CDA),226 anti-SLAPP (Strategic Law-
suits Against Public Participation) laws,227 and the like.228
Direct litigation from businesses against authors of defamatory
reviews, apart from MRS platforms, can help correct certain MRS
market information. If the civil litigation mechanism works prop-
erly, businesses can identify defamatory reviewers and pursue action
against them, if the benefit of correcting the information exceeds
the costs. But the risk of facing such litigation from well-resourced
businesses may even chill legitimate negative reviews by under-
resourced users, creating a potential information supply problem.
Generally, business litigation against defamatory reviewers should
align with consumer interests in receiving authentic information,
224. David Adam Friedman, Case Count, supra note 222 (search results on file with
author).
225. Id. (though neatly categorizing these claims proves challenging, at least half of them
fit this description).
226. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012).
227. See, e.g., CA. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16–.18 (West 2016 & Supp. 2017); FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 768.295, 720.304 (West 2011 & Supp. 2017); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/1–/99
(2017). “California’s anti-SLAPP statute permits courts at an early stage to dismiss meritless
defamation cases ‘aimed at chilling expression through costly, time-consuming litigation.’
The statute was passed in 1993 in response to the legislature’s concern that strategic defama-
tion lawsuits were deterring citizens from exercising their political and legal rights.” Price v.
Stossel, 620 F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). By one count, twenty-eight
states have enacted anti-SLAPP laws. See State Anti-SLAPP Laws, PUB. PARTICIPATION PROJECT,
http://www.anti-slapp.org/your-states-free-speech-protection/ [https://web.archive.org/
web/20171018053318/https://anti-slapp.org/your-states-free-speech-protection/] (last vis-
ited Oct. 17, 2017). For an extensive discussion of the origins and early impact of anti-SLAPP
laws in California, see Kathryn W. Tate, California’s Anti-SLAPP Legislation: A Summary of and
Commentary on its Operation and Scope, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 801 (2000).
228. See, e.g., Albert v. Yelp, Inc., No. G051607, 2016 WL 3910830 (Cal. App. 4th July 5,
2016) (attorney unsuccessfully bringing defamation claim against Yelp for publishing dispar-
aging reviews); Brompton Bld’g, LLC v. Yelp, Inc., No. 1–12–0547, 2013 WL 416185 (Il. App.
1st Jan. 31, 2013) (apartment complex unsuccessful in attempt to plead defamation against
anonymous party, relieving Yelp of obligation to disclose identity); Courtney v. Vereb, No.
CV–12–655, 2012 WL 2405313 (E.D. La. June 25, 2012) (physician unsuccessfully bringing
defamation claim against Angie’s List for publishing disparaging review by another
physician).
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unless the threat of such litigation overly chills honest reviewers.229
Users can gain from any purity resulting from battles over untruth-
ful reviews as third-party beneficiaries.
This category of litigation, however, tends to involve the integrity
of the content of the reviews, not the core problem of concern in
this Article: the way paid advertising potentially undermines user
expectations of authenticity. The MRS is simply the vessel of the
information under scrutiny in these matters.
The sampling of the litigation directly involving the MRS reveals
that private parties are mostly focused on review content, not on
litigation that indirectly polices any advertising practices related to
contextual advertising. A challenge to the algorithm could be con-
sidered close to that category, and one of those cases is discussed.
Also,  four categories of private civil litigation involving MRS plat-
forms are briefly explored, all touching on the quality and integrity
of MRS information. The question remains whether competition
from users, in conjunction with litigation by private actors, can suf-
ficiently address the contextual advertising problem. This
exploration starts with a discussion of defamation actions.
1. Defamation Litigation.
Defamation actions brought by businesses directly against MRS
platforms engage the barrier of the CDA.230 Section 230(c)(1)
maintains that “no provider or user of an interactive computer service
shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information pro-
vided by another information content provider.”231 Federal and
state courts have construed the definition of “interactive computer
service” broadly,232 regularly shielding MRS systems from liability
229. See David G. Savage, Blogger Beware: Your Postings Can Lead to Lawsuits, L.A. TIMES
(Aug. 23, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/aug/23/nation/la-na-blogger-suits-2010
0823. Eric Goldman observed,
Most people have no idea of the liability they face when they publish something on-
line . . . . A whole new generation can publish now, but they don’t understand the
legal dangers they could face. People are shocked to learn they can be sued for post-
ing something that says, “My dentist stinks.”
Id. If this threat is absorbed by the reviewing public, reviewers may be overly cautious, but the
sheer number of extant reviews points in the general direction that reviewers remain highly
active.
230. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012).
231. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (emphasis added).
232. In part, the statute defines “interactive computer service” as “any information ser-
vice, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple
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for the words of users. As a result, Yelp frequently receives subpoe-
nas seeking the identity of reviewers—at one point, at the rate of six
per day—presumably to enable reviewed entities to engage in civil
action against them.233 Of course, MRS platforms often present a
more lucrative target for plaintiffs than disgruntled individual
users, so they occasionally draw complaints that are quickly
dismissed.
For example, in Westlake Legal Group v. Yelp, Inc.,234 a law firm
brought suit against Yelp and a user, Schumacher, for defaming the
firm in an online review.235 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the case, noting that
“courts have generally accorded § 230 immunity a broad scope.”236
In Seaton v. TripAdvisor, LLC,237 a resort owner unsuccessfully sued
TripAdvisor for defamation. The MRS put the resort on a list: “Dirt-
iest Hotels—United States as reported by travelers on
TripAdvisor,”238 along with a picture of a torn bedspread with a user
quote, “There was dirt at least 1/2[“] thick in the bathtub which
was filled with lots of dark hair.”239 The court noted that “even if the
complaint . . . had alleged that TripAdvisor’s users’ statements
[were] defamatory, TripAdvisor [could not] be held liable for its
users’ statements under the [CDA].”240 Courts have consistently and
summarily shielded MRS platforms on these grounds.241
The CDA enables the MRS to play the role of intermediary with-
out absorbing liability for content provided by users. Without this
statutory protection, the MRS would absorb the risk associated with
users to a computer server . . . .” 47 U.S.C. §230(f)(2). See generally 3 E-COMMERCE AND IN-
TERNET LAW 37.05[1][B] THE GOOD SAMARITAN EXEMPTION (SECTION 230 OF THE CDA)
(CIRCUIT AND STATE LAW SUMMARY) (2015).
233. Loten, supra note 223.
234. 599 Fed. Appx. 481 (4th Cir. 2015).
235. Id. at 482.
236. Id. at 485.
237. 728 F.3d 592 (6th Cir. 2013).
238. Id. at 598–99.
239. Id. at 599.
240. Id. at 599, n.8.
241. See, e.g., Reit v. Yelp, Inc., 907 N.Y.S.2d 411, 414 (Sup. Ct. 2010) (“Yelp’s selection of
the posts it maintains on Yelp.com can be considered the selection of material for publica-
tion, an action ‘quintessentially related to a publisher’s role.’ Accordingly, Yelp may not be
considered an internet content provider, so that Reit’s defamation claims are barred by the
CDA.”); Kimzey v. Yelp, Inc., 21 F.Supp.3d 1120 (W.D. Wa. 2014) (holding Yelp immune
under Section 230 from defamation and civil racketeering claims). But see Hassel v. Bird, 203
Cal. Rptr. 3d 203, 208 (Ct. App. 2016), cert. granted, 381 P.3d 231(Cal. 2016) (holding that
CDA Section 230 did not prevent court from ordering Yelp to remove allegedly defamatory
reviews, despite the fact that Yelp was not a named party in the defamation suit). This hold-
ing has drawn sharp criticism from commentators. For a catalog of critics, see Eric Goldman,
The Internet Rallies Against a Terrible Section 230 Ruling—Hassell v. Bird, TECH. & MARKETING L.
BLOG (Aug. 22, 2016), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2016/08/hassell-v-bird.htm.
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publishing all user content, thus rendering the system impractical,
if not impossible, to operate. Aggrieved reviewed entities therefore
only have one avenue—identify and pursue individual user-review-
ers, most of whom lack the financial resources of an MRS platform.
This type of civil litigation could help improve the overall au-
thenticity of MRS information. That said, the mechanism is far
from perfect for correcting information. In some scenarios, busi-
nesses might “over litigate” and intimidate under resourced users
who write negative views. In other scenarios, businesses might
“under litigate” and not have the resources to combat a coordi-
nated defamation campaign launched by disgruntled employees or
competitors. Defamation actions will not provide a clear corrective
mechanism for market information. As for any concerns raised by
contextual advertising, defamation actions serve little function.
2. MRS Algorithm-Challenging Litigation.
Recent litigation involving MRS algorithms involves businesses
suing MRS platforms over perceived bias in review presentation, in
part as a result of unproven allegations of salesforce extortion.242
Some businesses perceived that the MRS punished them after they
spurned solicitations to advertise on the platform.
Litigation has not yielded any proven MRS extortion nor evi-
dence that the MRS has followed through on an “advertise-or-else”
threat from a salesforce. In Levitt v. Yelp, Inc.,243 the plaintiffs, own-
ers of an animal hospital, filed a class-action suit “alleg[ing] that
Yelp extorted or attempted to extort advertising payments from
them by manipulating user reviews and penning negative reviews of
their businesses.”244 The Ninth Circuit dismissed the case, finding
that the plaintiffs failed to allege claims amounting to extortion,245
wrongful threats of economic loss by manipulating user reviews,246
or sufficient facts to infer that Yelp authored bad reviews.247
On the way to these conclusions, the court explained that even if
the substance of the plaintiffs’ allegation were true, an MRS still has
242. See Eric Goldman, Court Says Yelp Doesn’t Extort Businesses, FORBES (Sept. 3, 2014, 12:20
PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2014/09/03/court-says-yelp-doesnt-extort-
businesses/#68eae5e76e4a (“For years, Yelp has been dogged by allegations that it manipu-
lates user reviews to coerce businesses to advertise with it . . . businesses aren’t likely to stop
grumbling about these concerns any time soon.”).
243. 765 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2014).
244. Id. at 1126.
245. Id. at 1130, 1136.
246. Id. at 1133.
247. See id. at 1135.
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broad latitude to withhold, publish, and order the presentation of
reviews.248
[The plaintiffs] have no claim that it is independently wrong-
ful for Yelp to post and arrange actual user reviews on its
website as it sees fit. The business owners may deem the post-
ing or order of user reviews as a threat of economic harm, but
it is not unlawful for Yelp to post and sequence the reviews. As
Yelp has the right to charge for legitimate advertising services,
the threat of economic harm that Yelp leveraged is, at most,
hard bargaining.249
The court concluded by emphasizing that “extortion is an ex-
ceedingly narrow concept as applied to fundamentally economic
behavior.”250 Though Yelp may not have engaged in any nefarious
activity, the court nonetheless gave latitude to the methods of MRS
advertisers. In theory, competition and the desire to preserve integ-
rity to retain users should serve as something of a natural check on
MRS manipulation. Nonetheless, the MRS has the incentive to ma-
nipulate its platform in such a way that users perceive it as
authentic, while selling businesses on the notion that their advertis-
ing dollars would be best spent on appearing on this attractive,
authentic platform.
Businesses have challenged the truthfulness of MRS representa-
tions about neutrality with respect to algorithms that determine
presentation and aggregation of reviews. For example, in Deme-
triades v. Yelp, Inc.,251 the plaintiff restauranteur claimed that he
suffered injury from Yelp when, on behalf of his businesses, he
“purchase[d] advertising from Yelp based on Yelp’s [untrue and
misleading] representations that user reviews were filtered,”252
therefore providing an attractive advertising platform. The plaintiff
focused on five statements Yelp made about its “filter” to consum-
ers, which the court deemed exceeded puffery:253
(1) “Yelp uses a filter to give consumers the most trusted re-
views”;254 (2) “All reviews that live on people’s profile pages go
through a remarkable filtering process that takes the reviews
248. Id. at 1134.
249. Id. at 1134.
250. Id. at 1137.
251. 175 Cal. Rptr. 3d 131 (Ct. App. 2014).
252. Id. at 136.
253. See id. at 143–44.
254. Id. at 135.
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that are the most trustworthy and from the most established
sources and displays them on the business page. This keeps
the less trustworthy reviews out so that when it comes time to
make a decision you can make that [decision] using informa-
tion and insights that are actually helpful”; (3) “Rest assured
that our engineers are working to make sure that whatever is
up there is the most unbiased and accurate information you
will be able to find about local businesses . . .”; (4)”Yelp is al-
ways working to do as good a job as possible on a very
complicated task—only showing the most trustworthy and use-
ful content out there”; and (5) “Yelp has an automated filter
that suppresses a small portion of reviews—it targets those sus-
picious ones you see on other sites.”255
The plaintiff challenged whether Yelp “[gave] consumers the
most trusted reviews” and the filter’s accuracy in identifying “trust-
worthy reviews” from “trustworthy sources.”256 According to the
plaintiff’s allegations, Yelp’s filter “suppressed more than only a
small portion of reviews; allowed posts of the ‘most entertaining’
reviews to be shown on the unfiltered portion of the Web
site . . . .”257 The appeals court allowed this lawsuit to proceed,
deeming these claims outside the protection of the CDA,258 in what
could be considered an exceptional “end-run” around the
statute.259
The court held that the plaintiff’s claims concerned Yelp’s com-
mercial speech about its own offerings, not third-party reviews.260 At
trial, the filter and related practices could have been analyzed and
measured against the claims, but the case apparently settled before
this phase.
In sum, regulators should take note that MRS platforms have the
right to tinker with the presentation of peer reviews with opaque
algorithms, right along with the presentation of contextual advertis-
ing. Self-regulation and competition for users constrains the MRS
presentation to a degree, but litigation over presentation linked to
255. Id. at 135–36.
256. Id. at 136.
257. Id.
258. See id. at 145.
259. See Eric Goldman, Does Yelp Have the ‘Most Trusted Reviews’? A Court Wants to Know
More, FORBES (July 30. 2014, 11:15 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2014/
07/30/does-yelp-have-the-most-trusted-reviews-a-court-wants-to-know-more/#38056a8d4748
(criticizing the court’s failure to characterize Yelp’s claims as “puffery” and the decision,
along with others, as having the potential to undermine the aims of Section 230 of the CDA).
260. Demetriades, 175 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 145.
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algorithms has only succeeded to an extent—and the contextual
aspect of advertising presentation is not directly at issue.
3. Consumer Subscriber Litigation.
A consumer can maintain a direct fraud claim against an MRS
that violates claims about the “filter” of reviews. For example, in the
class action Moore v. Angie’s List, Inc.,261 the lead plaintiff consumer
pled fraud, unfair trade practices, and breach of contract against
Angie’s List, alleging that the MRS did not display reviews based on
the advertised algorithm.262 Of note, Moore did not just rely on
MRS reviews as a free user.263 She had a contractual membership
agreement with Angie’s List.264
According to the plaintiff, Angie’s List allegedly made the follow-
ing representations about how it sorted through and presented
reviewed companies:
A provider’s position in your search results is determined by
their recent grades and number of reviews. Companies with
the best ratings from members will appear first. To help pre-
vent the same providers from always showing up first,
companies who have earned similar grades are rotated within
your results . . . . Companies with a poor rating from our mem-
bers will appear lower down on the List after businesses who
have earned good ratings for superior work.265
Moore claimed that she searched Angie’s List for a contractor to
remodel her kitchen and hired one based on the visible recommen-
dations, none of which were negative.266 After the contractor
botched the job, in Moore’s opinion, she posted a poor review of
the contractor on Angie’s List, “after which, [Moore] alleges, she
was able to see for the first time a number of other negative reviews
written by others, at least one of which revealed an experience iden-
tical to hers.”267 Moore claimed that she would not have hired the
contractor had she read those reviews, thus attributing injury to the
MRS’s manipulation of the review.268
261. 118 F. Supp. 3d 802 (E.D. Pa. 2015).
262. Id. at 805, 808–09.
263. Id. at 809.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 808 (citations omitted).
266. Id. at 809.
267. Id. (citation omitted).
268. Id.
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Moore alleged several means of manipulation, including that
Angie’s List simply “does not count negative reviews when compil-
ing a rating and fails to make a negative review readable.”269 Moore
contended that Angie’s List “extract[ed] ‘advertising fees’ from ser-
vice providers to ensure that positive reviews are highly visible and
factored into a service provider’s rating and search result
ranking.”270
Moore based her allegations, in part, on a confrontation with an
Angie’s List employee who did “did not characterize . . . the sup-
pression of negative reviews . . . as an oversight or a technological
error.”271 This led Moore to believe that what she read prior to hir-
ing the contractors was the product of a quid-pro-quo at odds with
Angie’s List’s express claims that search results and grades reflected
a true summary of the reviews.272 Moore alleged that Angie’s List
concealed the negative review of the contractor because the con-
tractor paid off the company, and in so doing, defied her
“reasonable expectation, as a member, that she would have access
to all reviews for a given service provider.”273 Her suspicions were
stoked by an electrician acquaintance who claimed to her that “he
pays ‘to be at the top’ of [Angie’s List] search results.”274
As noted in the Introduction, Angie’s List settled this case with
Moore,275 admitting no wrongdoing.276 Nonetheless, this class ac-
tion presents a rare example of a user complaint involving the
advertising practices of an MRS. The fact that the complaint had
contractual roots undoubtedly strengthened the plaintiffs’ posi-
tion—Angie’s List made contractual representations to paid
subscribers. A pure user case about misleading presentation of ad-
vertising would lack access to this pathway. This case does, in some
respects, involve contextual advertising, but it appears to stand
alone, and in some ways contrast, with the relationships that Yelp,
Avvo, Google, and Facebook have with their review users.
269. Id. at 808–09.
270. Id. at 809 (citation omitted).
271. Id. (citations omitted).
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id. (citation omitted)
275. See Class Action Settlement Agreement, supra note 2.
276. Id. at 4–5.
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4. Right of Publicity Litigation.
The class action plaintiffs in one recent case against an MRS
came close to addressing authenticity issues related to contextual
advertising, but the action failed to advance on First Amendment
grounds.277 In that suit, the putative lead plaintiff, a lawyer, chal-
lenged Avvo’s nonconsensual use of his identity alongside
advertisements for competing lawyers.278
In attempting to stop this contextual advertising practice entirely
on right of publicity grounds,279 these plaintiffs attempted to travel
much further with their argument than the policy approach sug-
gested here. The attorneys’ profile information was public, and
presenting competitive commercial messaging around that profile
is not per se troubling, as long as the user fully understands the con-
text of the advertising.
This Article advocates heightened scrutiny of contextual MRS ad-
vertising, not abolition. As a whole, all of this peer information, in
conjunction with advertising, puts more information into the mar-
ket. The challenge is to ensure that consumers are not confused or
misdirected by this information. Any prescription should preserve
the flow of valuable peer information—just as the shield of Section
230 has accomplished—while facilitating better consumer under-
standing of the entirety of the MRS platform’s presentation.
Enhanced disclosure beyond that already required may prove to
be the mechanism for accomplishing these ends, though conced-
edly, disclosure as a general remedy is not without critics.280
IV. THE CASE FOR REGULATION THROUGH DISCLOSURE
AND PRIORITIZED SCRUTINY
Market forces and private incentives for improving the quality
and authenticity of MRS presentations still leave room for addi-
tional improvement, as no strong mechanism exists to help
consumer users appropriately contextualize AGC embedded in es-
pecially powerful UGC. Any such mechanism should be employed
277. Vrdolyak v. Avvo, Inc., 206 F. Supp.3d 1384 (N.D. Ill. 2016).
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. See, e.g., OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL. E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO
KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE 182 (2014) (suggesting that the benefits of
mandated disclosure are outweighed by social costs such as undercutting other methods of
regulation); Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl. E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U.
PA. L. REV. 647, 737–42 (2011) (discussing areas in which mandated disclosures are inade-
quate solutions).
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delicately and with precision, however, so as not to do more harm
than good.281
The most readily-available, though concededly imperfect, mecha-
nism for improving the totality of information available to MRS
users would be enhanced mandatory disclosure. Such enhanced
disclosure requirements would need to meet a higher bar than the
baseline for native advertising.282 If surpassing the baseline proves
impractical, prioritizing the MRS platforms for scrutiny may be
appropriate.
A. Enhanced Disclosure
Disclosure requirements often function as a regulatory informa-
tion solution. The recent guidance on native advertising focuses on
disclosure as the primary means of preventing consumer confusion
resulting from the context of an advertisement. These very same
disclosure requirements can be tailored to address the contextual
advertising unique to MRS platforms.
1. Disclosure as Information Solution.
The disclosure category of regulatory intervention is well-estab-
lished.283 Beales et al. catalogued regulatory “information
remedies” to address market failures. Beales and his coauthors dis-
tinguished the remedies into three categories: “[1] removing
restraints on information; [2] correcting misleading information;
[and] [3] encouraging additional information.”284 In this instance,
enhanced disclosure could serve the purpose of correcting mislead-
ing information, such as the “misleading door openers” identified
in the Enforcement Policy statement.285 Also, “encouraging addi-
tional information,” in the form of encouraging disclosures that
281. Recently, I offered a cursory and incomplete case for “elevating scrutiny” of MRS
platform advertising. See Friedman, Addressing Commercialization, supra note 4 at 75–76. I also
briefly offered a vague prescription for thoughtful intervention in this zone but did not
tender any concrete guidance. See id. at 85–86.
282. See, e.g., Native Advertising, supra note 7.
283. See Christine Jolls & Cass Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199,
207–08 (2006) (discussing the role of added information in consumer safety).
284. Beales et al., supra note 173 at 513–31 (discussing role of disclosure in face of con-
sumer optimism). As noted, Beales et al. also cautioned about the difficulty of regulating
information markets. Id. at 514.
285. See supra Part II.B; see FTC Enforcement Policy Statement on Deceptively Formatted
Advertisements, 81 Fed. Reg. 22596, 22598 (Apr. 18, 2016).
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ensure users understand the entirety of the MRS presentation of
peer reviews, could also provide an “information remedy.”
Christine Jolls and Cass Sunstein have generally explored the
role of “additional information” and disclosure in the context of
consumer safety law.286 Some of their observations extend to issues
of disclosure related to MRS platform advertising. Jolls and Sun-
stein observe that “[c]onsumers may not adequately understand . . .
risks because they lack factual information [and] because they suf-
fer from bounded rationality—most familiarly because of the
phenomenon of optimism bias . . . .”287 Where consumer misunder-
standing, distorted by the optimism bias, reflects the mere “lack of
information,” they note George Stiglitz’s identification of the “tradi-
tional corrective”—”the straightforward provision of additional
information.”288
Native advertising may not provoke the optimism bias, but it may
unduly influence consumers with “source-based misleadingness.”289
Credible context of an advertisement can lend the message extra
power because “consumers evaluate a claim based on the source of
the claim rather than the content of the claim.”290 As Chris Hoof-
nagle and Eduard Meleshinsky found in their survey of advertorials:
Advertorials draw on the authority of their editorial context
and thereby cause consumers to give them the same deference
as they give to editorial content. The trappings that surround
an advertorial . . . prompt[ ] readers to give the advertisement
consideration similar to what they accord the editorial con-
tent. This transfer of trust can be explained by reference to
source-based misleadingness.291
286. Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 283 at 207–08.
287. Id. at 207. Jolls and Sunstein explain the optimism bias: “[P]eople typically think
that their chances of a range of bad outcomes, from having an auto accident to contracting a
particular disease to getting fired from a job, awre significantly lower than the average per-
son’s chances of suffering these misfortunes—although, again, this cannot be true for
everyone.” Id. at 204. For a more formal overview of the optimism bias, see David A. Armor &
Shelley E. Taylor, When Predictions Fail: The Dilemma of Unrealistic Optimism, in HEURISTICS AND
BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 334, 334–47 (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin
& Daniel Kahneman eds., 2002).
288. JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 90–91 (1986); Jolls & Sun-
stein, supra note 283 at 207.
289. Chris Jay Hoofnagle & Eduard Meleshinsky, Native Advertising and Endorsement:
Schema, Source-Based Misleadingness, and Omission of Material Facts, TECH. SCI. (Dec. 15, 2015),
http://techscience.org/a/2015121503.
290. Id.
291. Id.
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Hoofnagle and Meleshinsky analyze advertorials, but the concept
of “editorial context” should also extend to MRS platforms. As
noted extensively in Part II.A., peer information carries special
weight and power, and advertising placed in the MRS context,
which presents an aggregation of peer information, should, by ex-
tension, also receive extra deference. In this case, additional
information would correct this “source-based misleadingness,” just
as Jolls and Sunstein prescribed for correcting the optimism bias.
The regime for regulating native advertising has been disclosure-
based—the question is whether this approach suffices for MRS plat-
forms in particular.
2. Disclosure in Native Advertising.
The FTC’s recent guidance on native advertising advises on “how
to make clear and prominent disclosures [‘of the native ad’s com-
mercial nature’] . . . to avoid misleading consumers.”292
a. General Disclosure Requirements
The FTC sets effectiveness standards for these disclosures. “Only
disclosures that consumers notice, process, and understand can be
effective. Inadequate disclosures can’t change the net impression
created and won’t stop consumers from being deceived that adver-
tising or promotional messages are something other than ads.”293
With respect to MRS platforms, the “net impression created” from
the commercial content viewed in combination with the peer-infor-
mation content should guide adjudications of “adequacy.”
For general native-advertising disclosure effectiveness, the FTC
recommends that advertisers focus on “proximity and placement,”
“prominence,” and “clarity of meaning.”294 The guidance related to
“proximity and placement” unlocks the key to a prescription for
heightened MRS platform disclosure.295 The FTC suggests that ad-
vertisers “place disclosures on the main page of a publisher site
where consumers will notice them and easily identify the content to
which the disclosure applies,” cautioning advertisers against assum-
ing that consumers internalize every piece of information on the
292. Native Advertising, supra note 7 at III.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id.
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site.296 To avoid confusing consumers, the FTC suggests that “a sin-
gle disclosure that relates to more than one native ad should be
accompanied by visual cues that make it clear the disclosure applies
to each ad in the grouping.”297
In online or mobile device contexts, “[o]nce consumers arrive
on the click-or tap-into page where the complete native ad appears,
disclosures should be placed as close as possible to where they will
look first.”298 Perhaps related in spirit to this Article’s ultimate MRS
disclosure prescription, the FTC recommends that “in multimedia
ads, a disclosure should be delivered to consumers before they re-
ceive the advertising message to which it relates.”299
The framework for enhanced regulation for MRS platforms can
be drawn from these more general guides directed at advertisers
and publishers. As noted, proximity and sequencing would likely be
key to ensuring that the “net impression” from MRS advertising is
adequate. Such sequencing should ensure that consumers under-
stand that visiting a peer-information platform will take them
through AGC before reaching peer content, for example.
b. Problems with Native-advertising Disclosure Effectiveness.
Native advertising regulation remains in its infancy, rendering no
appropriate time better than the present to contemplate enforce-
ment prioritization. In the months since the FTC released the
Enforcement Policy Statement on Deceptively Formatted Advertis-
ing, not much evidence has surfaced to support the premise that
the policy has been effective in changing behavior.
According to one study, the new policy and guidance have not
yet yielded evidence of a substantial change in advertising prac-
tices—while “sponsored content” continues to proliferate.300 In
early 2016, research firm MediaRadar audited retail websites, find-
ing seventy percent of them out of compliance with the
guidelines.301 Further demonstrating that retailers are either out of
or not yet in step with the Native Advertising Guidelines,302 just five
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. See generally Marty Swant, Publishers Are Largely Not Following the FTC’s Native Ad Guide-
lines: Popularity of Branded Content is Soaring, ADWEEK (Apr. 8, 2016), http://www.adweek
.com/digital/publishers-are-largely-not-following-ftcs-native-ad-guidelines-170705/.
301. Id.
302. Native Advertising, supra note 7. The FTC prescribes certain terms as “likely to be
understood” as labeling paid advertising content. Id. Namely, “ ‘Ad,’ ‘Advertisement,’ ‘Paid
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percent of retail sites reviewed incorporated the word “ad” in native
advertising.303 Granted, the novelty of native advertising regulation,
though in the works for several years,304 makes it premature to as-
sess the FTC’s approach to native advertising.305 The lack of
compliance does raise the question of whether the FTC has substan-
tially raised the profile of the problem, despite its efforts. Raising
the profile for MRS platforms becomes an even more daunting
task, in part because of the absence of attention from the FTC.
3. Prescription for MRS Disclosure.
Before offering a simple, starting-point prescription for native
advertising on MRS platforms, note that the FTC does not even di-
rectly or substantially address MRS platforms. The Native
Advertising Guides offer seventeen fact-pattern-style “examples of
when businesses should disclose that content is native advertis-
ing,”306 none of which include the MRS.307
Advertisement,’ ‘Sponsored Advertising Content,’ or some variation thereof.” Id. The FTC
recommends labels the descriptions “ ‘Promoted’ or ‘Promoted Stories’ [as] at best ambigu-
ous and potentially . . . misleading [consumers to believe] . . . that [the] advertising content
is endorsed by a publisher site.” Id. Also designated as potentially troublesome were
“Presented by [X],” “Brought to You by [X],” “Promoted by [X],” or “Sponsored by [X]”
[because they could reasonably be interpreted to] mean that a sponsoring advertiser funded
or “underwrote” but did not create or influence the content. Id.
303. Swant, supra note 300.
304. See, e.g., Press Release, FTC, FTC Announces Agenda, Panelists for Native Advertis-
ing Workshop (Nov. 18, 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2013/11/
ftc-announces-agenda-panelists-native-advertising-workshop (announcing workshop on the
“blurring of digital ads and content,” including representatives from the FTC, media compa-
nies, publishers, advertising agencies, academia, the advertising law bar, advertising interest
groups, and at least one advertiser).
305. Despite the apparent absence of general compliance in the retail sector, the FTC has
not been dormant on the enforcement front. The Commission entered into a consent decree
against the retailer, Lord & Taylor for “[im]properly disclos[ing] paid native advertising and
online endorsements for its products.” See Decision and Order, In re Lord & Taylor, LLC, No.
C-4576 (F.T.C. May 20, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/160523
lordtaylordo.pdf. Specifically, the FTC alleged that Lord & Taylor failed to disclose author-
ship of content appearing as articles and Instagram posts in a fashion magazine. See
Complaint, In re Lord & Taylor, LLC, No. C-4576 (F.T.C. May 20, 2016), https://www.ftc
.gov/system/files/documents/cases/160523lordtaylorcmpt.pdf. Though the Lord & Taylor
matter presented a classic example of an advertiser deceptively placing paid, commercial
content, appearing to consumers as natural content, the advertising did not have an immedi-
ate call to action. Advertising on an MRS enables the seller to reach consumers primed to
buy, on a platform that promotes access to neutral opinions. The native appearance might
require more of an alarm.
306. Native Advertising, supra note 7.
307. See generally id.
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The Guides’ examples cover hypothetical advertising on financial
news sites,308 online news, lifestyle, and informational magazines,309
and home improvement shows,310 among others. Express concerns
about native advertising tactics include “ads . . . integrated into con-
tent, including entertainment programming and video games,”311
and even ”virtual world” games, and game apps.312 Among this ex-
pansive and exhaustive list of content integration scenarios,313 the
FTC completely omits the MRS advertising context.
All of the recommended guidance on native advertising should ap-
ply as a baseline to MRS-platform commercial content. However,
due to the yet-to-be-demonstrated effectiveness of this advertising
regulation, perhaps a more focused and targeted set of rules should
be deployed, given the power of peer endorsements, and given the
immediacy of the role of the MRS in influencing transactions.
As noted in Part I.A., Yelp’s mobile app has been downloaded to
a staggering one-third of all mobile devices in the United States.314
Facebook, containing a supportive MRS within, boasts over a half-
billion “mobile-only” users globally.315 Google Maps, the center of
gravity for the Google supportive MRS, has over a billion users (“ed-
itors”) and a substantial mobile presence, as well.316 It is not
difficult to conclude that huge numbers of people access MRS plat-
forms through mobile apps.317 The mobile app might present the
most fruitful initial opportunity to intervene via enhanced disclo-
sure requirements.
308. Id. at ex. 1.
309. Id. at ex. 2, 3, 4, 6 & 8.
310. Id. at ex. 12, 13, 14 & 17.
311. Native Advertising, supra note 7.
312. Id.
313. Though perhaps demonstrating some forward thinking in issuing guidance on “vir-
tual world” games, considering the recent popularity of Pokemon Go. See Alex Oller, No Fad:
Niantic CEO Insists Pokemon Go is Still Going Strong, ASSOC. PRESS (Feb. 28, 2017), https://
apnews.com/8f967839e1d74678b727c8b4e8568a94/no-fad-niantic-ceo-insists-pokemon-go-
still-going-strong.
314. YELP, INVESTOR PRESENTATION, supra note 21, at 7.
315. Anthony Ha, More Than Half a Billion People Access Facebook Solely from Mobile, TECH-
CRUNCH (Jan. 28, 2015), https://techcrunch.com/2015/01/28/facebook-mobile-only-2/.
316. Aleks Buczkowski, The US Mobile App Report—Google Maps App 64.5M Users, Apple Maps
42M, GEOAWESOMENESS (Oct. 27, 2014), http://geoawesomeness.com/the-us-mobile-app-re-
port-google-maps-app-64-5m-users-apple-maps-42m/; Sarah Perez, Google Maps is Turning Its
Over a Billion Users into Editors, TECHCRUNCH (July 21, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/
07/21/google-maps-is-turning-its-over-a-billion-users-into-editors/.
317. Though Yelp appears to lead the way on mobile presence, TripAdvisor and Groupon
are not far behind. Angie’s List appears to have less presence. See YELP, INC., YELP INVESTOR
PRESENTATION Q4 2016 5–6 (2016), http://www.yelp-ir.com/static-files/a52e3812-f443-4d11-
9bcf-a36a0eddc0b4.
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The FTC already recommends, “[o]nce consumers arrive on . . .
tap-into page where the complete native ad appears, disclosures
should be placed as close as possible to where they will look first”—
but perhaps this disclosure should also be made with a crisp disclo-
sure about sponsored content—every time the app opens—or upon
use of that app feature.318 If that mandate proves too cumbersome,
perhaps a regular, programmed periodic disclosure upon opening
the app would be more fitting. The frequency of the disclosure only
needs to generate a “net impression” of the nature of the entirety of
the content of the MRS presentation.
Using the mobile app as the starting point would enable to
policymakers to experiment in a context where users frequently put
the MRS platform to work. The immediacy of mobile, combined
with evidence that “consumer opinions posted on line” are strongly
influential in leading users to take action, makes it rational to look
here first.319 After a geo-search for a business, users might have to
scroll through advertisements before they can reach any peer re-
views. In a zone where disclosure might need to be more brief and
crisp due to space, simplicity matters. Finding the right balance of
delivering effective information without making the apps inconve-
nient to access will prove important. The burden of the regulation
should not outweigh the welfare benefits of free and open accessi-
bility to this valuable peer data.
Of course, any disclosure initiatives should be subject to formal
testing before deployment and evaluation. There might be many
possible ways to match the “net impression” with reality. Recogniz-
ing that there might be a need for intervention is the important
prerequisite for choosing the opportunity and tool for such
intervention.
B. Prioritizing MRS Scrutiny
Enhancement of disclosure for MRS platforms may indeed prove
too clumsy to enforce or may empirically project to be ineffective or
inefficient. In that case, regulators have the option to apply existing
standards but prioritize scrutiny of MRS practices over other native
advertising locales.
The Commission’s native advertising guide offers a “final note”:
“The FTC’s Enforcement Policy Statement on Deceptively Format-
ted Advertisements doesn’t apply just to advertisers. In appropriate
318. Id.
319. See supra Part I.A.1.
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circumstances, the FTC has taken action against other parties who
helped create deceptive advertising content – for example, ad agen-
cies and operators of affiliate advertising networks.”320
The MRS platforms, in their entirety, host a significant amount
of native advertising within a unique and powerful format. The
aforementioned “appropriate circumstances” could incorporate
MRS practices that unduly misdirect or disrupt the consumer’s ex-
pected platform experience.
The FTC has spoken informally about enforcement and MRS
platforms in the media. In 2015, Mary K. Engle, Associate Director
of the Division of Advertising Practices, said, “User ratings [and re-
views] would be material to consumers, so they have to be truthful
and non-misleading . . . whether it’s a movie, a vacation purchase,
electronics . . . . You go online to see what other consumers are
saying . . . . [W]e’re looking at issues where those reviews aren’t
what they purport to be.”321 If the FTC follows through on these
issues, the effects of the advertising sold around those reviews
should be examined, too—but there has not been evidence of fol-
low through.
Like every enforcement issue before them, the FTC should weigh
the costs and benefits of intervention systematically and with
rigor.322 Regulators should correct the omission of specific con-
cerns about MRS platforms.323 Rigorous consideration of the effects
of MRS-platform advertising is in order, and guidance and enforce-
ment, where appropriate, should be the product of that
consideration. Given the evidence that the demographic that trusts
and uses MRS data will be moving into prime spending years, the
time to begin examining MRS platforms with more care is now.
CONCLUSION
MRS platforms have created immense value by making peer ex-
periences widely accessible to consumers who are searching for
information to guide transactional decisions. These platforms are
already ubiquitous on devices, both mobile and traditional. The
emerging generation of consumers trusts information from this
platform over many other traditional sources.
320. Native Advertising, supra note 7 (emphasis added).
321. Walt Hickey, Be Suspicious of Online Reviews, Particularly Fandango, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT
(Oct. 15, 2015, 9:52 AM), http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/fandango-movies-ratings/.
322. See Friedman, Refining, supra note 132 (prescribing a new approach toward prioritiz-
ing FTC advertising enforcement actions).
323. Apart from the fairly opaque investigation into Yelp in 2014.
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Some of these platforms are highly dependent on advertising
from the entities they review, which presents a tension between
presenting the purity of authentic peer information and generating
revenue. This tension can be resolved. The market rewards per-
ceived authenticity, so competition can partially ensure that MRS
platforms will self-regulate their presentations so as not to confuse
or mislead consumers. Competition alone, however, may not always
yield clear messaging about paid content displayed amidst peer
content.
Businesses have the incentive to police the truthfulness of their
reviews but typically only through litigation against users, not the
MRS, to which the CDA affords protection. Users, unless they have
contractual privity through subscription models, generally lack civil
recourse against freely-accessible MRS platforms for misleading
them through native advertising.
Therefore, regulators should experiment with a disclosure re-
gime. This regime should ensure that consumers understand their
MRS experience, commercial and non-commercial, in totality. A
careful effort would improve the way that consumers use this valua-
ble information while ensuring that the information continues to
flow. No regulatory regime should be permitted to burden unduly
the flow of this valuable information.
